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INTRODUCTION
The American State Department throughout its history . 
has been the target of much criticism. Rarely, however, 
were the officials of this department subjected to such 
vituperation as during the period from June of 1940 to 
December of 1942. The basis for this criticism was the 
position the department took in its relations with the 
Vichy government of war-time Prance. From the moment the 
department decided to maintain relations with Vichy, this 
decision proved to be one of the most bitter controversial 
issues of the period.
In the main, the American liberals were the most 
vociferous of the many groups that were voicing criticism 
of the department's attitudes and actions that subsequently 
came to be called the Vichy policy. The leaders of this 
liberal public opinion were often President Roosevelt's 
most ardent supporters. The barrage of criticism at times 
grew to such height that he became restive, but he never 
wavered in his belief that the policy he was following was 
the one best calculated to promote our diplomatic and 
military aims.
Since the war has ended there have been works devoted 
to the subject, trying to substantiate either, on the one
-1-
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hand, that the State Department was right or, on the other, 
that the risk entailed was not worth the gain. William 
hanger's hook, Our Vichy Gamble, and the Hull Memoirs are 
foremost works in the field to prove the State Department's 
case, while Charles A. Beard and others have tried to dis­
prove this stand. For the foreign point of view, Churchill's 
outstanding six volume history of the Second World War and 
Robert Aron's L'Histoire de Vichy are invaluable. In all 
works that mention the subject it is often noted that "the 
Liberals" were especially loud in their criticism of a 
particular action. Wowhere, however, has this criticism 
been evaluated. Whenever this criticism has been mentioned 
the author has found it sufficient to insert a few quota­
tions simply to prove that the liberals did have something 
to say on the subject. This has tended to show the liberal 
cause as completely one-sided against the State Department. 
This thesis will show this was not entirely the case.
As the former secretary of state, Cordell Hull, states 
in his memoirs:
During the period of intense criticism against our 
Vichy policy before the landing in Horth Africa, the 
President and I labored under the handicap of being 
unable to announce the advantages that were accruing to 
us from that policy. We could not expose the results 
of the contacts we were keeping in Vichy and in Horth 
Africa or of the economic accord with Weygand. Easy 
as it was to criticize, it was correspondingly hard to 
give the whole story. Publishing a balance sheet of 
our policy would have prejudiced the policy itself and incited the Germans to require Vichy to reduce or
-5-
eliminate these contacts and negative sic their 
results. Consequently, the criticism accumulated with 
virtually no opposition until it solidified into a 
position that no doubt will endure for years. 1
Among the many factors that should now be included in this 
"balance sheet" is an evaluation of the liberal criticism of 
this policy. It is impossible to attempt to cover all this 
criticism in a paper of this kind; therefore, it is limited 
to five leading liberal periodicals.
These periodicals are The Hew Masses, The Nation, The 
New Republic, Commonweal and The Christian Century. They 
are often considered the core of liberal opinion. The New 
Masses, as a front magazine for the Communist Party, ex­
pressed an extreme left-wing position. In the center were 
The Nation and The New Republic, and on the right, Common­
weal and The Christian Century. Commonweal, the Catholic 
liberal magazine, has often been criticized as being too 
conservative but the position this magazine took on the 
Spanish Civil War, for instance, warrants its inclusion here 
as a liberal magazine. Other magazines often considered 
typical liberal periodicals, such as Common Sense and The 
New Leader, would have been included in this study but were 
not available at this institution.
The attitudes expressed in these periodicals will be
1 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Yol. 
11 (The Macmillan Company, 194-8), p. 1194-.
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considered in the light of the facts as known generally 
when the events took place and then in the light of in­
formation which has been revealed since the end of the war. 
In conclusion the position of each periodical will then be 
weighed against the State Department and the results of the 
policy it followed.
CHAPTER I
THE POLICY IS FORMULATED 
May-July, 1940
Although the name developed later, the elements of the 
Vichy policy appear as early as May, 1940 when the Germans 
ended the "Phony War" and invaded the Low Countries and 
Prance. President Roosevelt and State Department officials 
were deeply concerned with the speed of the German conquests. 
What would happen if Prance fell, and Great Britain were to 
follow ? This would give the Bazis control of two of the 
world's largest navies at a time when the United States had 
the major portion of its fleet concentrated in the Pacific, 
and the advocates of a two-ocean navy had not yet won their 
argument. Domination of the Atlantic would give them the 
initiative in any war with the Western Hemisphere.
These considerations made the future of the still siz­
able French fleet important. President Roosevelt expressed 
his concern to Premier Reynaud on May 26 when he wrote:
While we still hope the invasion will be checked, if 
the worst comes to the worst, we regard retention of 
the French fleet as a force in being as vital to the 
reconstruction of French colonies and to the ultimate 
control of the Atlantic and other oceans and as a 
vital influence towards getting less harsh terms of 
peace. That means that the French fleet must not get 
caught up in the Mediterranean. Those ships in the 
eastern Mediterranean must be in a position to exit
- 6 -
through the Suez Canal. Those at Toulon, Tunis and 
Algiers must he able to exit past Gibralter and be in 
a position, if the worst comes, to retire to the West 
Indies or to safe ports in the West African posses­
sions. ..
Finally, if the Germans hold out alluring offers 
to France based on surrender of the fleet, it should 
be remembered that the offers are of no ultimate value 
and that the condition of France would be no worse, 
but in fact would be far stronger, if the fleet were 
removed as a whole to safe places. 1
The French fleet, at this point, was relatively unscathed 
and ready for action. If France fell and the fleet were 
available it would be invaluable in helping to protect Great 
Britain against the expected invasion and also in keeping 
the sea lanes open between England and the United States. 
Further, it could neutralize the Italian fleet in the Med­
iterranean and also protect the French overseas colonies.
Before the armistice was negotiated the American 
government insisted that the fleet should not, under any 
circumstances, be turned over to the Germans, and that if 
surrender of the fleet were part of the German terms, then 
the armistice should be rejected. The State Department went 
so far as to say that, "... should the French government fail 
to take these steps and permit the French fleet to be 
surrendered to Germany, the French government will per­
manently lose the friendship and goodwill of the govern-
William L, Danger, Our Vichy Gamble (Efew York: A. 
A. Knopf, 1947), p. 13*
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2ment of the United States."
The terms of the armistice were finally released June 
23rd. It contained 24 articles by which France was divided 
into two zones, the northern half to be occupied by the 
Germans while the southern half was to be wholly under French 
administration. Other terms provided that the army was to 
be demobilized and all aircraft were to remain where they 
were at the time of the signing. The most important item 
from the American standpoint was Article 8:
Apart from the portion which shall be left to the 
French government for the protection of its interests 
in its colonial empire, the French war fleet must be 
assembled in ports later to be disignated; it shall 
there be demobilized and disarmed under German and 
Italian supervision. The selection of these ports shall 
be made in accordance with the ships' home bases in 
peace time. The German government solemnly states to the 
French government that it does not intend to use for 
its own war purposes the French fleet which will be 
stationed in ports under German control, with the ex­
ception of such units as may be necessary for guarding 
coasts and raising mines. Moreover, the German govern­
ment solemnly states that it does not intend to lay 
claim to the French fleet when peace is concluded.
Apart from that portion of the French fleet (to be 
determined later; which is to defend French interests 
in the colonial empire, all warships now away from 
France are to be brought back to France. 3
The armistice,.and especially this article, brought
forth a storm of criticism from British and American
2 Hull, op. cit., 1, 792.
Pertinax Andre Geraud , The Grave Diggers of 
France (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Go.,1944), 
p . 445•
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officials. They protested that the German word was worth­
less, and demanded stronger assurances that the fleet would 
not fall into the hands of the Hazis. Admiral Darlan,
French Admiral of the Fleet, tried to reassure the British 
and the Americans by issuing secret orders to the fleet. 
These orders instructed the fleet to make preparations for 
scuttling in the event the enemy or an "ex-ally" should
attempt to seize a ship by force. Furthermore, this order0
was to remain in force even if contradictory orders, signed
4.by Darlan himself, were later issued. But even the secret 
scuttling order did not set other minds at ease. Gould not 
there be, for instance, other secret orders known only to 
the French to be used when circumstances changed ? This 
was just one of the many questions being asked not only by 
government officials, but also by the American liberals.
American liberal criticism during this period, and for 
the remainder of 194-0, dealt mainly with internal French 
politics and particularly with the new regime that the 
Petain-Laval group was attempting to establish. After the 
signing of the armistice, The Hew Masses claimed that 
Britain now faced, "...at least a German siege in which the 
larger part of the French navy, in combination with Italian
^ Robert Aron, L'Histoire de Vichy (Ottawa: Le 
Cercle du Livre de France, Ltee., 1955) > p. 74-.
-9-
and German naval forces, will bring the contest to British
5shores." We know that this never happened bat it shows 
the temperament of some of the liberals at the time. In 
this same article The Hew Hasses set the pattern it was to
follow for the next year when it claimed France was under­
mined by the policies of certain men, the counterparts of 
whom "...own and rule America." Further, it stated the 
French Communists were the, "...only force whose policies 
were correct, and in whom the hope of the future lies."
The article ended by stating that the French defeat meant 
a, "...setback to the war plans of the Roosevelt administra­
tion..." and further that, "...Roosevelt shares with the 
ruling circles of France and Britain responsibility for the 
debacle." Thus right from the beginning this periodical was 
against the new regime in France, and against Roosevelt and 
his administration. Also, from the beginning of the period 
this magazine showed marked contempt for the other magazines 
we will be investigation in this study. In one article, for
instance, The Hew Masses claimed The Nation and The Hew
Republic has been corrupted by the "bankrupt intellectuals"
6they employed as writers.
5 "How France Was Betrayed," The Hew Masses, June 
25, W O ,  pp. 4-5.
6 Ibid
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The Hew Republic claimed the Petain group was anti- 
liberal. Commenting on the armistice, this magazine said 
the French people and the world would not have known any­
thing about the terms of the agreement if the British infor-
7mation office has not published them. ' It should be noted 
here that throughout the war one of the main fears of both 
American and British officials was that all the terms of 
this armistice had not been published. After the war, how­
ever, it was found that the French had revealed all the 
terms to the State Department immediately after the document 
was signed. Throughout the last six months of 1940 it is 
significant that both The Hation and The Hew Republic 
attributed most, including the article cited above, of their 
news concerning France to British sources. Would this tend 
to color the attitudes these magazines were to take in the 
future ? The reader should keep this in mind as we note
the comments that are to come in the months to follow.
/The question of recognition of the new Petain govern­
ment was never openly discussed by the American State 
Department. At the outset there had been some talk of 
following the British example and allowing relations with 
France to lapse. It was realized, however, that the fate 
of the French fleet could only be influenced by direct re-
^ ^ke Hew Republic, July 1, 1940, pp. 3-4.
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presentation at Vichy. Traditionally the American policy 
of recognition had never taken into account the form or 
ideology that a government professed. The only test had 
usually "been whether a government was willing to live at 
peace with the United States and live up to its internation­
al obligations. At the time, it will be remembered, the 
United States still recognized Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy 
and other totalitarian powers such as Japan and Russia.
Thus it was decided to be the better part of wisdom to 
maintain relations with France, and to do whatever could be
Idone to keep the new regime from falling completely under
the influence of the conqueror. Our Vichy policy now
contained 3 basic points: 1.) The French fleet must not be
used against the United States; 2.) Germany and Italy must
not get control of French bases in North and West Africa
or in the Western Hemisphere; 3-) Ihe Vichy government must
be kept from going beyond the terms of the armistice into
8the realm of open cooperation and collaboration.
On the other side of the ledger the United States would 
accrue many benefits. By maintaining an enbassy in Vichy 
the United States could encourage the French by convincing 
them that the Americans were behind them. Through the em­
bassy at Vichy close watch could be maintained on develop-
8 Langer, on. cit., p. 80.
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ments within France and its colonies. Finally, the United 
States could obtain information (from its representatives) 
which would otherwise not be available.
V.
On the other hand, however, as the critics were to 
point out, there were many developments that would spring 
from this policy that had not been reckoned with beforehand. 
The cloak of legitimacy thus attained by the Vichy govern­
ment was to prove invaluable to retaining the loyalty and 
devotion of most of the overseas possessions. As Gabriel 
Paux, the French High Commissioner at Beirut put it, "How
could I suspect a government with which the United States
Qcontinued full diplomatic relations ?" It also helped 
the Vichy government to represent General Charles De Gaulle, 
who since June 18 has been recognized by the British as the 
leader of the Free French resistance movement, as a 
dissioent, a usurper and a traitor. Because of the American 
action, then, it was always extremely difficult for de Gaulle 
to present has movement as the legitimate government of 
France.
As for de Gaulle The Hew Masses said:
There is a steady flow of discredited French politic­
ians— Leon ("Hon-Intervention") Blum is one of the 
latest—  to London where General de Gaulle operates 
a French "national committee" for Churchill. Even if 
de Gaulle were replaced by Blum it would not help the
^ Pertinax, op. cit. , p. 4-57.
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10prestige of this stooge committee.
At about the time this was written (July 9» 194-0), it should 
be noted, Leon Blum was being detained in a french prison 
by the Petain government. He never was to go to London 
throughout the war. At another point The Hew Hasses claim­
ed, when speaking of the armistice, that, "...he , Hitler 
tore up one of the armistice terms, permitting the French to 
scuttle their ships if they were unable to run the British 
gauntlet." ^  This was not true; this term was never in­
serted into the armistice and was not discussed at the 
armistice talks. These two instances of obvious falsifica­
tion are pointed out early to underline the fact that the 
periodicals under discussion often did not have the true 
facts of a case. Throughout this thesis, it will be 
indicated where these periodicals printed false facts blat­
antly as the truth. This practice was especially prevalent 
during the period from June to December, 194-0. Also, it 
may seem strange that there was little liberal comment on 
the ?ichy policy during this period. This may be explained 
by the fact that events effecting the policy were in con­
tinual flux and it was difficult for anyone— including the 
liberal writers—  to know what was going on in Europe at
^  Hew Hasses, July 9, 194-0, p. 24.
Hew Hasses, July 15, 1940, pp. 70-71 •
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the time.
CHAPTER II
A PERIOD OP WAITING 
July-Dee ember, 194-0
During the period July-December, 194-0, there were many
conflicting reports as to what was really happening in
Europe. Por example, it was not clear, whether the French 
\had revealed all the contents of the armistice to the 
Americans. This suspicion, of course, was not revealed to 
the French but it is noted in much correspondence between 
high American and British officials. Thus, the State Depart­
ment was continually looking for further and stronger assur­
ances from the French concerning their fleet. Numerous 
events in France, during the period, tended to make certain 
acts of the Tichy government look suspicious.
The new form of government instituted on July 10 was 
one of these actions that irked the officials of the State• i
Department and provided material for critical liberal pens.
On that date the members of the French legislature, sitting
as a constitutional convention, by a vote of 56? to 80
passed a resolution stating:
The National Assembly gives complete power to the 
Government of the Republic under the signature and on 
the authority of Marshal P4tain, President of Ministers, 
for the purpose of promulgating, by one or more acts, 
the new constitution of the French state. This con-
-15-
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v
stitution shall guarantee the right of Labor, the 
Family, and the Fatherland. It shall be ratified by 
the assemblies which it shall create. 1
This decree gave Marshall Petain dictatorial powers to use 
as he saw fit. In this country, the old marshal was affect­
ionately known as "the George Washington of France" and was 
looked upon as the bulwark against the forces that would 
have left France as a full collaborator with the Nazis. On 
the other hand, his association with such dubious men as 
Pierre Laval (who introduced the decree giving Petain dicta­
torial powers) was mystifying to many. Just previous to 
the establishment of the new government, Laval went so far 
as to say, "Since parliamentary democracy wished to enter 
the ring against Nazism and Fascism, and since it has lost
2the fight, it must disappear from the face of the earth." 
Later, in the summer of 1942, he was to go further and open­
ly announce he had hopes for a German victory. State De­
partment suspicions were well founded especially after 
Petain took Laval into his new government. These suspic­
ions were shared by The New Republic which commented that, 
"Petain is undoubtedly a patriotic Frenchman but this 
eighty-four-year-old general is not only old and tired but
■*" Paul Farmer, Vichy-Political Dilemna (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1955)> p . 140.
2 Pertinax, op. cit., p. 471.
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he is also a friend of Franco." This magazine also con­
demned him for appealing to Hitler's mercy and to his "...
Zlhonor as a soldier for an ’honorable peace'..."
Both The Hew Hasses and The Christian Century noted the 
connection of the new regime and the Roman Catholic Church. 
The Christian Century claimed the official paper of the 
Vatican, Qsservatore Romano, had hailed the new French 
political order. In the same article it went on to say,
"The corporate state which Laval is about to proclaim is in 
full agreement with Pius XI's ideas of social organization; 
Petain and Weygand, [the then French High Commissioner in 
North Africa] as martial sons of the church, represent the 
Roman ideal of competent administration." The Christian 
Century also noted the great significance of the Vatican 
rapprochement with France was the Catholic hope that,"... 
after the end of the war a Latin bloc may be formed... bound 
together by a religious tie, and able to resist inundation 
by a culture based upon state totalitarianism." It added 
that, "...ultimately, it would aim toward the reassertion 
in Europe of a Catholic totalitarianism, unknown in modern
 ̂Marshal Petain previous to his inclusion in the 
war cabinet of Premier Reynaud, in June of 1940, was the 
French ambassador to Spain.
^ The Hew Republic, June 14, 1940, p. 844.
^ The Christian Century, July 17, 194-0, pp* 893-894-.
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history..." ^
The New Masses also mentioned the Catholic connection: 
"Significantly, it has the Vatican's blessing," hut express­
ed the hope that, "The men who hold this bastard power will
7not hold it for long." ' Later, in a description of the new 
regime's leaders it described Petain as, "...one of the 
architects of appeasement... a main lobbyist for Franco," 
and one who, "...helped to wreck the Franco-Soviet Treaty 
that could have meant peace." It also stated that General 
Veygand told the French negotiators at the armistice talks 
not to ask for the return of the two million French prison­
ers since, "...they would come back and overthrow the Petain 
8regime." This assertion, however, has never been substan­
tiated. On the contrary, one of the most persistent demands 
of both Petain and Laval was the release of French war 
prisoners.
In July the British decided to deal directly ("opera­
tion Catapult") with the threat posed by the continued 
existence of the French fleet. On July 3 combined units of 
the British fleet converged on elements of the French fleet
^ Ibid., September 25, 1940, pp. 1166-1168.
^ ^ke New Masses, July 23, 194-0, p. 16.
8 Philippe Deval, "Four Musketeers of Betrayal," 
The New Masses, July 30, 1940, p. 5»
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stationed in Portsmouth and Plymouth in England,, and at
Alexanderia and Mers-el-Kebir in North Africa. The ships
in English ports were taken over by an overwhelming force
which stormed the units as they lay at their piers, unaware'
that any action was pending. The ease with which this
phase of the operation was carried out was later cited as an
example of how easily the Germans could take over the French
ships stationed in metropolitan ports once they had control
of the port area. In North Africa the French commanders
were given an ultimatum with three choices. Either they
could follow the English to British ports and Join them in
the fight against the Axis, or they could sail to American
ports and allow themselves to be demobilized. If neither of
/
these conditions were acceptable then the French commanders 
were given the suggestion that they should scuttle their 
ships. If none of these conditions were accepted within a 
certain length of time, the English warned the French they 
would fire upon them. At Alexanderia the French commanders 
allowed their ships to be demobilized in the roadstead and 
put under English surveilance, but at Mers-el-Kebir the 
French chose to fight. When the smoke finally cleared at 
Mers 1,500 French sailors had lost their lives, and most of 
the units there were put out of action for months to come. 
The resultant clamor in French official circles can be im­
agined, but in the United States immense relief spread
-20-
through the highest government offices, for the British 
action meant time had been gained to prepare for the pro­
tection of the Western Hemisphere. ^
Bor the liberals, "Catapult” meant a great danger had 
been lifted from our shores. The Hew Masses said, "The re­
sult has been that one great danger to the British— and
10ultimately to the United States— has been removed." The
Nation claimed the British attack on the French at Mers-el-
Kabir was justified because it was an act of self defence,
but they said it was also "...obviously justified by Petain's
refusal to keep the nation's promise to turn over the fleet
11to Britain in case of surrender." In this instance The
Nation was not necessarily stating the true facts since 
this was the British argument and even today the French will 
not admit that this was the case in 1940.
After "Catapult" France broke off diplomatic relations 
with the British, and American ties with Vichy became that 
much more valuable. Now a new feature was added to the ex­
panding Vichy policy. An attempt would be made to bring the
12French and British closer together. Before any success
^ Winston Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: 
Houghton Miffling Co., 1948-19537, U  p. 239.
10 The New Masses, July 15, 1940, pp. 70-71.
The Nation, July 13, 1940, p. 21.
12 Hull, op. cit., 1, p. 804.
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could be achieved, however, General de Gaulle persuaded the 
British that an attack on the French colony of Dakar could 
prove profitable and would help in establishing his claim as 
the rightful heir to administer the sovereignty of France.
In September the attempt was made and failed. This action 
tended to further separate the British and the French and 
helped to establish in the minds of the men of the State De­
partment a suspicion of de Gaulle. The Hew Hasses immed­
iately took up the cry against the Free French and Churchill 
and added a new twist by asking:
"Is it possible that Lord Lothian, the British ambass­
ador, connived with the administration and the State 
Department to stage a demonstration off Dakar that 
. would impress the American people with new and alarming 
dangers to this hemisphere ?” 13
The Hation, relying on British information sources,, falsely
stated that de Gaulle decided to withdraw his troops without
14provoking a fight among the French. The Free French
were not only beaten off by gunfire from the beaches but 
their representatives who did succeed in landing were either 
arrested or killed.
Up to this point the Catholic liberal magazine Common­
weal had no comment to make on the situation in France or 
on the State Department’s relations with the new regime.
^  The Hew Masses, October 8, 1940, pp. 24-25
1 4 The Hation. September 28, 1940, p. 257 •
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In this month Commonweal1s future position could be discern­
ed indirectly by some comments that were made about de 
Gaulle. It remarked that the armistice had been carried 
out by military men and that military tradition had pre­
vailed ‘both inside and outside France by these same men 
obeying orders. It went on to say that de Gaulle and his 
followers "...are simply volunteers in foreign service
acting on their individual responsibility... Any talk of
15their being the 'real' French government is absurd." 
Throughout the period under study Commonweal was to main­
tain this position toward de Gaulle and, as we shall see, to 
advocate the maintenance of the Vichy policy.
In this same month the Vichy High Commissioner of Indo- 
China signed an agreement with the Japanese giving them 
protective rights over the Indo-Chinese railroads and 
centers of transportation. All the liberal magazines let 
this incident go by without comment except The Hew Hasses 
which claimed the State Department had helped the Japanese 
seize Indo-China by shipping arms and airplanes to Siam 
which this magazine claimed was Japan's accomplice. In the 
final analysis this magazine stated the matter was simply a 
case of American and Japanese imperialism. In the light
^  Commonweal, September 13, 194-0, p. 418.
The Hew Masses, October 1, 1940, p. 14.
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of the American policy toward Vichy, however, this was to
prove to be a major setback for the United States when the
Japanese decided to bomb Pearl Harbor. In the process this
seizure of Indo-China made it far easier for the Japanese
to take Hong Kong and the Philippines.
One of the most crucial periods in Franco-American
relations came in October when P^tain consented to meet
Hitler at Montoire in southern Prance. The first hint that
a meeting was to take place came from the British. In the
British note there was a fear expressed that the main units
of the French fleet, then based at Toulon, would be turned
17over to the Germans. Secretary of State Hull delivered
a strong warning to Gaston Henry-Haye, the newly arrived 
French ambassador to the United States. There was no reply 
from the French and the meeting took place on the twenty- 
fourth. The agreement, the full text of which was not pub­
lished until after the war, had among its parts such state­
ments as:
The Axis powers and France have an identical interest 
in seeing the defeat of England accomplished as soon 
as possible. Consequently, the French Government will 
support, within the limits of its ability, the measures 
which the Axis powers may take toward this end. The 
details of this practical cooperation will be dealt 
with in a special agreement between Germany and Italy 
on the one hand and France on the other.
17 Churchill, op. cit,. 11, 513*
X8 hanger, op. cit., p. 95.
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The details of the collaboration were to be worked out later 
and Petain thus felt he was Justified in agreeing to the 
principle of the general clauses which in fact meant agree­
ing to the principle of collaboration. He admitted this 
upon his return when he broadcast to the nation that, ”A
collaboration between our two nations was considered. I
19accepted the principle of it.”
It was commonly supposed in this country that Hitler
had promised Prance a final peace in return for the fleet,
cession of certain bases and a repartition of the colonies.
The news issuing from Montoire and Vichy seemed so ominous
it was decided that the President should send a strong
personal note to Marshal Petain. The note stated:
The government of the United States received from the 
Petain government during the first days it held office 
the most solemn assurances that the French fleet would 
not be surrendered. If the French government now per­
mits the Germans to use the French fleet in hostile 
operations against the British fleet, such action would 
constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith 
with the United States Government.
Any agreement entered into between France and 
Germany which partook of the character of the above 
mentioned would most definitely wreck the traditional 
friendship between the French and the American peoples, 
would permanently remove any chance that this govern­
ment would be disposed to give any assistance to the 
French people in their distress, and would create a 
wave of bitter indignation against France on the part 
of American public opinion.
If France pursued such a policy as that above out-
Ronald Matthews, The Death of the Fourth Re­
public (New York: Praeger, 1§54-), p.
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lined, the United States could make no effort when the 
appropriate time came to exercise its influence to 
ensure to Prance the retention of her overseas possess­
ions. 20
Petain was a little indignant at the wording of such a 
strong note but he replied:
Do answer the anxiety of President Roosevelt, 
Marshal Petain desires to state that the French Govern­
ment has always preserved its liberty of action and 
that he (Roosevelt) knew that he might be surprised at 
an appraisement as inaccurate as it is unjust. The 
French Government has declared that the French fleet 
would never be surrendered and nothing can justify 
questioning today that solemn undertaking. 2l
The meeting and the diplomatic exchanges concerning it
were so well guarded that none of this information leaked
out and there was no liberal comment on it. This incident
has been mentioned to point out that the liberal journals
did not have access to every type of information. And as
has already been shown, often the information they did have
access to was not always correct. As a final judgement on
the importance of the Hontoire meeting and its after effects
the words of Renther-Finck, Hitler's special diplomatic
delegate to Vichy, are of worthy note:
For me Montoire constitutes the greatest defeat of the 
whole German policy towards France. We gained nothing 
from it, and nearly lost everything we had. We did not 
succeed in winning France over to our cause, nor in
20 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped His­
tory (Hew York: Harper and Co., 1951)? PP* 39-40.
^  Ibid.. pp. 40-4-1
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occupying the whole of French territory. If there had 
not been Montoire, there would probably not have been, 
either an allied landing in Horth Africa, or our own 
debacle there. 22
After Hontoire the President was convinced that if the 
embassy in Yichy was to serve the purpose for which it had 
been established then the time had come to appoint a full 
time ambassador there. Roosevelt feared that certain ele­
ments in Prance, notably the Laval group, were pushing Pet­
ain and the Yichy government toward full collaboration and 
eventually into a war with Great Britain. At first General 
Pershing was approached but at the time he was very ill and 
it was decided to invite Admiral William D. Leahy, then 
governor of Puerto Rico, to take the post. In the letter 
of invitation Roosevelt said, "We need in Prance at this 
time an ambassador who can gain the confidence of Marshal 
Petain, who at the present moment is the one powerful ele­
ment of the French government who is standing firm against
23selling out to the Germans." ^ The President also felt, 
since Leahy was a navy man, that he could get close to 
those in charge of the French fleet and thus have a greater 
opportunity to influence them to keep the fleet out of the 
hands of the Germans. Leahy accepted and was appointed
22 David Thompson, Two Frenchmen (London: The 
Cresset Press, 1951), p. 78.
^  William D. Leahy, Was There (lew York: 
Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 6.
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Dec ember 20. He did not, However, arrive in Vichy until 
late in January.
Liberal criticism became more defined as the year drew 
to a close. Commonweal, for instance, stated in one art­
icle that, "The most effective means of opposing Hitlerism
lies somewhere between the extremes of appeasement and
24outright intervention." A second article was more ex­
plicit. Commenting on the Leahy appointment, it said the 
admiral would be ambassador to the French government and, 
"...not to the 'Vichy Government' which is a disparaging 
appellation used by people outside of France to mark their 
desire for barricades, suicide and vicarious heroism.
An ambassador," it added; is the best means our govern­
ment has found to secure information concerning the 
actions and intentions of foreign governments. We 
need that information now more than ever. It should 
not be based on hearsay: it cannot be made effective 
through absence. 25
The Hew Masses was consistent in its opposition to 
Roosevelt and Vichy by criticizing the Leahy appointment;
"It certainly makes quite a spectacle; the great Democrat
/ 26Franklin D. Roosevelt palsy-walsy with Marshal Petain."
Later it claimed the French ruling class was looking for 
time and better terms from the Germans waiting to see
P4 Commonweal, Hovember 8, 1940, p. 67.pc" Ibid., December 6, 1940, p. 164.
26 The Hew Masses, December 5* 194-0, p. 4.
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which way the war would swing, adding: "That there is de­
finitely such a trend is deducible from the British and
American diplomatic machinations with Vichy, of which the
27appointment of Admiral Leahy is one example..."
Meanwhile in Vichy on December 13, Petain tricked Laval 
into resigning. Petain's main accusation was that Laval had 
not kept him informed as to what was going on in the govern­
ment. In accepting Laval's resignation Petain said, "Every 
time you go to Paris, I ask myself what new ruin you will 
bring down on us. The French people don't trust you and
poneither do I." State Department officials saw this as
a good sign for future Franco-American relations. Before 
this, however, there had been a distinct line drawn be- 
tween Laval and Petain in so far as the feelings of 
Washington officials were concerned. To Roosevelt and 
other officials Petain was admired because he represented, 
in their minds, the strongest element standing against full 
collaboration with the Germans. Laval, on the other hand, 
represented those who stood for stronger ties with the 
Hazis. The importance of Laval to the Germans can be seen 
in a letter Hitler wrote to Mussolini commenting on his 
dismissal. In this letter Hitler says:
^  The Hew Masses, December 24, 1940, p. 18.
pQ Farmer, op. cit., p. 205*
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The French government has dismissed Laval. The 
official reasons that have been communicated to me are 
false. I do not doubt for a moment that the real 
reason is that General Weygand is making demands for 
Horth Africa which amount to blackmail, and that the 
Vichy government is not in a position to react without 
risking the loss of Forth Africa. I also consider it 
probable that there exists at Vichy itself a whole 
clique that approves of Weygand's policy, at tacitly.
I do not think that Petain personally is disloyal.
But one never knows. 29
The lation, in one of the few comments on the Laval dis­
missal, claimed the strongly anti-lazi and pro-British
attitude of the French people, "...was the real reason for
•50Laval's dismissal." ^ This is too simple a reason and 
would have provided food for argument within France at this 
time. The Nation, apparently, did not know the real reasons 
for the Laval dismissal as they are given above.
Thus by the end of the year the State Department had 
weathered one diplomatic storm, Montoire, chosen to send an 
ambassador to France, and had begun to define more fully 
its Vichy policy. Three of the liberal magazines under 
study also began to define their editorial policies toward 
the State Department and its Vichy program. From the be­
ginning The lew Masses was opposed to Roosevelt, to the 
administration and to Vichy and the State Department's 
attitudes toward the new regime. The Nation was becoming
^  Welles, op. cit., p. 57.
30 T M  Nation, March 22, 1941, pp. 312-313
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definitely more and more anti-Vichy and against the State 
Department's policy. Commonweal, on the other hand, was 
an advocate of the program Vichy was pursuing and thus 
favored the State Department and its actions. • Both 
Christian Century and The Hew Republic were against the 
forces ruling Vichy but were non-commital on the State 
Department and its Vichy program at this point.
CHAPTER III
THE TEAR OE DECISION'S 
January-December, 1941
At no time during the period of American relations 
with Yichy did the United States policy undergo such a test 
of strength as during the first six months of 1941. When 
Leahy arrived in Yichy in January his instructions had 
enlarged the Yichy policy and more fully defined it. In 
the first place he was instructed to gain the confidence of 
both Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan, who controlled the 
French fleet. Secondly, he was to convince the French that 
the best interest of France lay in the defeat of the Axis 
and thus this meant staying on the American side. Thirdly, 
he was to act as a "watchdog" to make sure the French did 
not go beyond the terms of the armistice. Along this line 
Leahy was to repeat "...to all and sundry that an Axis 
victory would mean the dismemberment of the French empire 
and reduce France to a vassal state." Fourth, the new am­
bassador was to seek renewed pledges that under no circum­
stances was the fleet to be turned over to the Germans. 
Leahy was also told that he was to warn the French when­
ever necessary that if the fleet was turned over to the 
Germans, France would forever forfeit the long-standing
-31-
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good will and friendship of the United States. ^ Fifth, 
the United States, through the Red Cross, would endeaver to 
send food to France insofar as this relief would not pre­
judice a British victory. Finally, in regard to the French 
Empire, the instructions said the United States desired to 
maintain the status quo in the West Indies and in French 
Guiana and thus all French warships in this area should he 
immobilized. As for North Africa, Leahy was to say that the 
United States was sympathetic toward the maintenance of 
French interests in the area and in improving its economic 
condition. In ending the instructions said the United
States was ready to assist in maintaining and improving its
2economic condition in any appropriate way.
Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the man who replaced Laval, 
lasted a brief and insignificant seven weeks. On February 
9 Admiral Darlan, in turn, replaced Flandin. While this 
political reshuffling was going on within France the ques­
tion of French North Africa came up for discussion between 
State Department officials and French representatives„over­
seas. Because of the lack of certain materials in North 
Africa the natives were becoming restive and it was feared 
the Germans might use this as an excuse to invade and take
■*" Leahy, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
2 Ibid., pp. 445-446.
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over the area. Also the State Department felt North Africa 
should he kept free of foreign influence as long as possible 
in case in the future Petain might desire to move his 
government there. With this in mind an agreement was drawn 
up by Robert Murphy, the former Counselor of the Embassy in 
Paris and now American Consul General for North Africa, and 
submitted through General Weygand to Yichy for its approval. 
After being approved by Yichy it was signed on March 10 by 
American officials in Washington.
The main points of the secret agreement, which came to
be known as the Murphy-Weygand Accord, stipulated that the
United States would supply North Africa with tea, sugar and
petroleum, the three products most desperately needed by
the native population. It was further stipulated that these
goods were to be consumed exclusively in North Africa and to
make sure that this was done American agents were to super-
*vise delivery and distribution.  ̂ These agents, however, 
as was revealed later, were to act as American spies in the 
area. In this capacity, they were not only to assure that 
the American imports did not reach the hands of the Axis, 
but they were also to report on the movement of trade and 
all significant military and political developments.
Weygand even gave the Americans permission to have diplomat­
5 Danger, op. cit., p. 135.
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ic pouch service and use a secret code in their communica-
4tions with Washington. Until the ships began to leave 
American ports for North Africa the liberals had no idea of 
this agreement and it was not until after the invasion of 
North Africa, at the end of 19̂ -2, that the agreement was 
revealed by the State Department.
During March and April the liberal magazines, not know­
ing of the Murphy-Weygand Accord, took potshots at other 
aspects of the policy. In particular they condemned Leahy’s 
efforts to have food sent' to feed French women and children 
in the unoccupied zone. The New Masses began the offensive 
by stating:
When the President accounces he will consider any 
power, or gang of generals as 'allies' of his 'demo­
cracy' if only they come to terms with him rather than 
Hitler, he confirms in public what has bong been 
obvious in practice: that the State Department has been 
working feverishly to buy off wel«b known 'democrats' 
like General Franco, Marshal Petain, and Maxime Wey­
gand, ready to give them food, and even arms if only 
they will switch sides. 5
The New Masses in its following issue came out against send­
ing any food to the French because as they saw it:
...with this measure, we have the unfolding of a 
policy whereby food becomes a direct diplomatic in­
strument. The distinction between humanitarian and 
political motivations disappears, gust as in this war 
the distinction between civilian and military fronts
^ Ibid., p. 179*
^ New Masses, March 25, 19^1> p. 11*
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has disappeared. Food, quite like guns and airplanes 
becomes an acknowledged weapon of war,^
•The Nation, again citing a British source, claimed the 
Germans could requisition food in the unoccupied and thus 
any food the United States sent to France would benefit the 
Nazis. Before any food was sent Leahy should submit a re­
port on the food exchange procedure in France since, "This 
is imformation to which we are entitled, whether or not the
Nazis object to its disclosure, before we are asked to urge
7Britain to modify its blockade." Later in the year both 
Commonweal and The Christian Century were to take stands on 
this issue in opposition to The New Masses and The Nation. 
For the moment Commonweal was satisfied in saying, "England 
is making an even greater mistake than she did at Oran 
{Mers-el-Kebir] in refusing to accept.American offers to 
help relieve, among others, the wants of the Belgian and
QFrench populations."
During this same period Commonweal praised Petain and 
his government by saying, "We were told that he could be a 
tool of Hitler. We find him unperturbably defending the 
honor of his country and voicing a social philosophy the
6 Ibid., April 1, 1941, p. 19.
7 The Nation, April 5, 1941, pp. 397-398.
8 Commonweal, April 25, 1941, pp. 14-15•
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9antithesis of Nazism." Later, in another issue, it said, 
"...this is certain. There is no legimate or constitutional
y 10French government today save the Petain government."
This was an indirect dig at de Gaulle and The New Masses
took up the refrain "by calling the Free French, "...another
11British phantom."
In March and April, Leahy became very suspicious of 
Darlan and his frequent meetings with the Germans in the 
occupied zone. The first indication that something was in 
the air came in March when Leahy was notified by British 
intelligence that the damaged battleship Dunkerque was pre­
paring to leave African waters presumably to head for a 
metropolitan port. When Leahy mentioned the matter to 
Pltain he said he had no knowledge of such a move but upon 
summoning Darlan he found the admiral had given the order 
without informing him. Immediately the order was counter­
manded but it became continually more and more apparent
that Petain was not being informed about many major decis-
12ions being taken in his name. Meanwhile, a revolt had
broken out against the pro-British government in Irak.
9 Ibid.« March 7, 1941, pp. 486-4-89.
10 Ibid.. April 25, 1941, pp. 14-15.
i
^be New Masses, April 8, 1941, p. 21.
Pertinax, op. cit., pp. 526-527.
-37-
This gave the Germans a chance to plan an intervention in 
the area and in order to facilitate operations they decided 
to ask-the French for certain concessions in the region, 
in early May Darlan was called to Paris by Otto Abetz, the 
German ambassador, to discuss the matter. After the pre­
liminary meetings showed Darlan to be submissive a meeting 
was arranged with Hitler for the eleventh. At this meeting 
Hitler showered Darlan with promises of what Vichy would 
obtain at the end of the war if she would cooperate now. 
Accordingly, on May 27-28, Abetz and Darlan signed the Paris 
Protocols. The French promised to allow the German air­
force to make use of their bases in Syria, to permit German 
submarines to use the naval base at Dakar and finally to 
permit the Germans to make use of French transport facilities
in Forth Africa for the supplying of their troops fighting
15the British in Egypt.  ̂ When certain persons close to 
Petain told him the news of Darlan's recent doings he seem­
ed to indicate that he knew nothing about it. After they 
pointed out that this could lead to an open break with the 
United States he consented to have Darlan and Weygand meet 
with him and discuss the matter. After a number of meetings 
the opposition to Darlan and the agreement that he had sign­
ed grew so intense that on June 6 he was forced to admit the
13 Danger, op. cit., p. 156.
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protocols should be reconsidered. A.t the next opportunity
he promised to bring them up with the Germans for discuss- 
14ion. Though the protocols were discussed other events in
the east, where Germany had invaded Russia, took the 
pressure off Darlan for the moment.
Meanwhile, the liberals were unaware of this new crisis 
just as they had been unaware of the Montoire meeting and 
its consequences. Nevertheless, whether referring to the 
crisis or not, The New Masses showed true insight by re­
marking at the same time, "Mr. Roosevelt is now compelled 
to cover up his fiasco, and he conceals it from the
American people by pronunciamentos to France which smells
15strongly of sour grapes."
At the end of his first six months in Vichy, Leahy, 
having weathered the business over the Paris Protocols, 
wrote the President that, "...it is impossible to guess 
what will happen in France tomorrow or the next day and al­
most as difficult for me to point to any useful accomplish­
ment that we have made here since my arrival six months 
16ago." It is amusing, at this point, to speculate what
the liberals would have had to say, had they known about the
14 Ibid., pp. 157-159.
Ike New Masses, May 27, 1941, p. 17.
16 Leahy, op. cit., p. 47.
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Par is Protocols and this note of Leahy's. Considering the 
extent to which Darlan had brought Prance so close to open 
and full collaboration with the Germans it seems amazing 
that the State Department continued to do business with his 
government. On first sight this seems to be the ease, but 
on second notice it is seen that this was not entirely the 
whole picture, for it was fairly clear that Petain was 
not in sympathy with the Darlan policy. Sceondly, there 
were many men within the government at Vichy who were openly 
collaborating with the United States and providing much 
information that could not have been gathered elsewhere or 
under any other circumstances. Por this reason alone the 
connection with Vichy at this point seemed worth keeping.
After the invasion of Russia Lhe lew Hasses was strange­
ly silent for two months on the subject of Vichy but The 
Ration claimed there had been little response in Prance to
the call for volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks and the,
17"...government dropped the entire plan." ' Again The 
Ration did not have the facts straight for the French 
government never officially sanctioned a volunteer brigade 
to fight the Bolsheviks, rather it was the brainchild of two 
rabid French Razis, Marcel Deat and Jacques Doriot.
^  Louis Dolivet, "Volcano Under Vichy," Ihe Ration 
July 26, 1941, pp. 67-69.
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Secondly, the plan was not dropped and eventually over five
thousand Frenchmen found themselves fighting on the Russian 
18front. In the same article The Ration voiced a criticism
of the Yichy policy that was to he heard many times before
the policy was abandoned in the last days of 1942. On this
point The Ration said:
Many persons in important positions who are now hesit­
ating would never allow themselves to be identified 
with Fascism. They are undecided at present because 
Yichy says that it is ’on excellent terms with the 
British and the Americans.' 19
In July also, the shipment of goods to Weygand in Rorth
Africa was beginning to be noticed and The Rew Republic,
after a long period- of silence on the subject, took time to
chide the State Department by saying:
Our State Department, which is yet to score its first 
success against Fascism anywhere in the world, has 
been thinking, and has reached the conclusion that the
most subtle use of our oil on behalf of democracy is
to make it available to Yichy and Japan. It smears 
General Weygand with 16,000 tons of this material to 
the visible distress of Prime Minister Churchill. By 
these actions the State Department declares its dis­
belief that France has been conquered. 20
Commonweal, at the same time, not being daunted by the
opposition building up against Vichy and the State Depart-
^  Farmer, op. cit., pp. 272-273.
19 Dolivet, op. cit.
20 Samuel Grafton, "A Rew Learned Society," The 
Rew Republic, July 21, 194-1* p. 83.
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ment's policy, continued to show its admiration for the 
French government by stating, "Actually the creation of a 
new order, or 'National Revolution' as the French call it, 
is not an empty slogan, but a vital necessity recognized by 
everyone.o." ^
In August the State Department came under the full 
editorial guns of both The Nation and The New Republic.
Both these magazines came out strongly for the recognition 
of General de Gaulle and his Free French Council of De­
fence in London. The Nation, noting that Yichy officials 
in Indo-China had just agreed to allow the Japanese to share 
their rule of the area, opened their attack by saying:
But if Vichy acted under 'duress' as Mr. Welles gently 
put it, what moral does it carry for the United States? 
Does it not prove— namely, that since the French 
government does not exist in any real sense, attempts 
to purchase its favor or give it help are nothing more 
than attempts to appease Berlin.
The question this country should ask itself is not the 
imbecile, self-answering question, is Vichy independ­
ent ? What this country should ask is the question, is 
there still time to prevent the full utilization of 
French African possessions by Hitler. And if Vichy 
surrendered Indo-China under duress then, on what 
theory should we continue to sell oil to the Vichy 
forces in North Africa ?
President Roosevelt has not put an end to the appease­
ment of Hitler's disguised agents in Vichy even though 
the covering has worn so threadbare that the State
21 Helen Iswolsky, "Rebuilding in France," Common­
weal , July 11, 1941, pp. 270-273.
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22Department acknowledges the existence of 'duress.'
After this searing attack the magazine advocated that we
combine with the British and de Gaulle and raid the Nazi
and Yichy bases in North Africa. In the next issue The
Nation let up a little by saying:
The combination of bribes and warnings applied to Yichy
may for the moment strengthen the elements which
oppose full and complete collaboration with Hitler in 
Africa. That it will fail in the long run we are 
certain. 23
In a long article The New Republic finally took a stand on
the issue by stating:
Of all the outrageous attempts of the State De­
partment to finger the strings of Hitler's puppets, the 
appeasement of Vichy has been the most amazingly un­
statesmanlike .
From the earliest days of Yichy, our policy has been at 
best stupid, at worst pro-Nazi.
We, in contrast, (to the British] are officially un­
aware of de Gaulle's existence...If we are to retain 
any respect among the peoples not only of France but 
of England, we must follow Churchill's lead...and 
recognize de Gaulle as Commander-in-Chief of the Free 
French and his Council of Defence of the French Empire 
as an authority with power to negotiate treaties. 24
The State Department remained steadfast throughout this
period and continued to resist the pressure that was build­
22 Freda Kirchwey, "The Abasement of Yichy," The 
Nation. August 2, 1941, pp. 84-85.
^  ‘Pke Nation, August 9, 1941, p. 16.
24 Michael Straight, "Vichy: The Failure of Appease­
ment," The New Republic, August 18, 1941, pp. 214-215.
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ing up for the recognition of de Gaulle. Vichy, in the
eyes of the State Department officials remained the only
legitimate government of France. The State Department's
position on this point was further strengthened by a note
from Leahy which stated:
"The de Gaulle movement has not the following in­
dicated in the British radio news or in the American 
press. Frenchmen with whom I can talk, even those 
completely desirous of a British victory, have little 
regard for General de Gaulle." 25
In conjunction with the Free French movement under­
ground resistance was building up in occupied France, es­
pecially after the invasion of Russia, for then the French 
Communists, with their many organized cells, could play a' 
full role. In mid-1941 a wave of assassinations broke out 
in France. In retaliation the Germans began to shoot fifty 
hostages for every one German killed. There were howls of 
indignation from the American press but Commonweal took an 
opposing stand by stating:
We have always been unwilling to ask of the French 
people that through resistance to German pressure they 
submit France to total occupation and to the full 
measure of German oppression. We have been unwilling 
to join with those, who from a safe distance, encourag­
ed the French people to a revolt which seemed to be as 
futile as it would be heroic... 26
The Nation's attack on the State Department heightened
25 Leahy, op. cit. , p. 43.
Commonweal, August 22, 1941, pp. 411-412.
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in intensity in September when it was announced that the
majority of those being executed by the Germans were
Communists. The magazine claimed that:
...if Nazi 'order' is established in Prance, whether by 
the German army or by French terrorists (the Vichy 
police and others) the responsibility for that shameful 
result will rest in large measure on the shoulders of 
the American government and on the American people. 27
The article went on to say that the American people must
wake up to the dangers inherent in our policy of continuing
to recognize Vichy. If the American people do wake up, the
article continued:
...the reactionary bureaucrats in the State Department 
will find themselves removed to posts in the more un­
important regions of the earth and an honorable, ener­
getic, pro-democratic policy will be put into effect.
The article ended by again calling for the immediate recog­
nition of de Gaulle and his movement. The New Hasses came 
back into the picture after three months with remarks on 
* Leahy, the Vichy embassy in Washington and de Gaulle. The 
magazine rebuked Leahy for attending the proceedings where 
Petain, ..formed his Fascistic legion" and criticized 
the administration for allowing, "...pro-Nazi espionage 
activities..." to take place at the Vichy embassy in
poWashington. In another article The New Hasses, after
27 Freda Kirchwey, "Which France Are We For ?", The 
Nation, September 6, 1941, pp. 191-192.
28 The New' Masses, September 16, 1941, p. 20.
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claiming de Gaulle and his Free French forces were "stooges" 
and "phantoms" of the British, began to take a more concilia­
tory attitude toward him by admitting he had many followers 
but adding, "...where the de Gaulle party sometimes goes to
the other extreme in its nationalistic fervor, the Communists
29espouse a broad internationalism." ' Later, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, The Mew Hasses will call for the 
recognition of de Gaulle and the Free French. Some possible 
•reasons why there was such a turnabout in their position 
will be discussed when their call for recognition is noted.
Finally, in October, the liberals did win somewhat of 
a concession when a representative of the Free French was 
officially received by the State Department. American ties 
with the Free French were further extended in the following 
month when the de Gaulle forces were granted the benefits 
of the "Lend-Lease" act. The President, ih a letter to the 
State Department, said he had extended de Gaulle these bene­
fits because, "...the defence of the territories rallied 
to Free France was vital for the defence of the U.S." ^  
Petain was a little irritated when he heard this news but 
after calling de Gaulle a traitor and explaining his hatred
^  Ibid., September 9? 1941, pp. 6-8.
50 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, trans, Jonathan 
Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), 1, 215.
to Leahy the matter was dropped.
November also saw the end of General Weygand as the 
French High Commissioner in North Africa. The Germans for 
a year had been pressing Petain to get rid of Weygand and 
as he (Petain) told Leahy they threatened to occupy all of 
Prance, to feed the entire army of occupation on French 
foodstuffs direly needed by the French themselves and event­
ually to starve the population by this method if Weygand was 
51not removed.  ̂ The State Department immediately retaliated
by suspending all economic aid to North Africa but since the
German offensive had bogged down on the Russian front it
was feared their attention might be turned to Africa and
the suspension was quietly lifted after only two weeks.
Only The Nation took space to comment on the dismissal.
They said, "Petain has thrown away his one face card," and
predicted the marshal would be pushed further because he
52had agreed to the Nazi demands. The importance the
Germans were supposed to have attached to Weygand was pro­
bably exaggerated for Hitler said after his dismissal,
"There are so many Weygands in France that any one of them 
could take over the role of the old retired general to-
51 Leahy, op. cit., p. 59*
^  Jal Allen, "Exit Weygand," The Nation, November 29, 
1941, pp. 555-536.
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morrow," ^
The fateful month of December, 1941 was to prove one of 
the most pressing months in the history of this country's 
foreign relations. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the 
importance of the French fleet became even more paramount 
since it was now felt it could more positively tip the 
scales to which ever side its commanders decided to fight 
with. The Nation and The New Masses continued their attack 
and began to call for drastic action on the part of the ad­
ministration. The Nation, in a full front page editorial, 
said, "The men in the State Department who engineered the 
policy of appeasement— are full partners in the guilt of 
Pearl Harbor.” It went on further to say:
The President has not yet convinced himself that the 
Munich mind operates with fatal effect in the Depart­
ment of State just as it did in the Foreign Office.
He still reposes confidence in men who have lost the 
confidence of the public. 34-
The New Masses said Pearl Harbor had shown clearly that the
policy of appeasement was played out and thus the United
States should:
...take the initiative, take over the French colonies,
Galeazzo Giano, Ciano1s Diplomatic Papers, edit. 
Malcolm Muggeridge, trans. Stuart Hood (London: Odhams 
Press, 1948), p. 462.
^  Freda Kirchwey, "Partners in Guilt,” The Nation, 
December 27, 1941, p. 656.
-4-8-
such as Martinique and the islands off Newfoundland, 
take over French Guiana, and prepare to move across, 
via the Azores, to Dakar itself. 55
Commonweal, on the other hand, proposed that the State
Department maintain its present position. The writer of
this article claimed that those who would throw the present
policy, "...are driving the French into Hitler’s arms.”
Further, the article stated, "Doubtless on the day we
break with France we will recognize de Gaulle as the head
of the French government; certainly that day we will recog-
56nxze Hitler as the spokesman for Europe."
Thus the year drew to a close but not without one 
last salvo. This time it was the turn of the Free French, 
for while all eyes were on the west coast in anticipation 
of a Japanese invasion it came on the eastern shores of St. 
Pierre and Miquelon where de Gaulle had decide to take 
matters into his own hands.
^  The New Masses, December 9, 194-1* P« 19*
56 C.G. Paulding,. "Toward a Policy," Commonweal, 
December 5* 1941, p. 159.
CHAPTER IV
THE 'SO-CALLED' AFFAIR OF ST..PIERRE-MIQUELON
With liberal criticism building up for the past 
twelve months and so many crises happening at once December 
appeared to be the worse month members of the State Depart­
ment would face for a long time. The final crisis came on 
Christmas Eve when news reached Washington that St. Pierre 
and Miquelon Islands had been invaded. The new crisis came 
from a quarter which until this point seemed hardly worthy 
of attention. It was directly because of this lack of 
attention, however, that General de Gaulle decided to send 
three warships under Admiral Emile Muselier to invade the 
Vichy held possessions of St. Pierre and Miquelon. These 
island, which lie just off the eastern coast of Newfoundland, 
the Free French claimed were sending radio signals and 
weather information to large German submarine packs that 
lay in wait throughout the area. De Gualle, writing after 
the war, said he had decided to provoke the affair, "... in 
order to stir up the bottom of things, as one throws a stone 
into a pond." ^ At the time no one could have done a better 
job of "stirring up" things.
^ de Gualle, op. cit. , p. 216.
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The immediate reaction of the State Department can he
seen in a note that was issued to the press as soon as the
news reached Washington. The note, which was signed by
Secretary of State Hull, read in part:
Our preliminary reports show that the action taken by 
three so-called Free French ships at St, Pierre-Miquel- 
on was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement 
of all parties concerned and certainly without the 
prior knowledge or consent of the United States Govern­
ment .
This government has inquired of the Canadian 
government as to the steps that government is prepared 
to take to restore the status quo of these islands. 2
This note, and especially its reference to three "...so- 
called Free French ships...", was to raise a stir among the 
liberals that has rarely if ever been equalled.
Before investigating the criticism that surrounded this 
event, however, a brief look at the facts that surrounded 
the invasion and the aftermath of the invasion is necessary 
in order to understand the underlying issues that were not 
always apparent at first glance. In the week previous to 
the invasion, the State Department had signed an agreement 
with Admiral Georges Robert, the Vichy representative at 
Martinique, guaranteeing the status quo of French possess­
ions in the Western Hemisphere. In return the French agreed 
not to ship back to France over twenty million dollars in
^ Robert Bendiner, The Riddle of the State Depart­
ment (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p.92.
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gold that had been deposited on the island when the war 
broke out or to transfer any military equipment from the 
French possessions to the homeland. They also agreed not to 
allow Nazi submarines to land at Martinique. A medical 
emergency was the only reason they could use for landing 
and this had to be confirmed by American naval authorities. 
All of these agreements were known as the Martinique 
Guarantee. Also, during this week, Admiral Muselier had 
approached the Canadian government for permission to take 
over the islands. The Canadians, after listening to his 
plan refused to allow him to go ahead without the prior 
approval of the United States. Muselier then paid a visit 
to Pierrepont Moffat, the American ambassador to Canada, 
and explained his plan. Moffat vetoed the idea and then 
Muselier asked permission to go to Washington to plead his 
case, but was refused a visa. ^
During the same period, de Gaulle had assured the. 
British that "...no orders for the operation had been issued 
and that it would not be carried out by the Free French
h.naval forces.'1 This note was sent on the seventeenth and 
the following day de Gaulle sent the following note to
3 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
4 Robert L. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An 
Intimate History (New York: Harper Company, 194-8), p. 482.
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Admiral Muselier:
I order you to proceed and rally Saint-Pierre and 
Miquelon "by means at your own disposal and without con­
sulting foreigners. I take the responsibility for this 
operation which has become indispensable to the perser- 
vation for France of her possessions.5
Thus it is readily seen that de Gaulle was not being faith­
ful to his friends and allies, the British.
Besides all the afore-mentioned, the State Department 
also had to keep in mind the obligation the United States 
had entered into when it signed the Havana Convention in 
194-0. In part this convention outlawed, "...the use of 
force to effect the transfer of sovereignty possession, or
control of any territory in the Americas held by belliger- 
6ent nations," Added to all this, the President had sent 
a personal message to Marshal P^tain noting Vichy France's 
proclamation of neutrality after war broke out between the 
United States and Germany stating:
You may rest assured the Government of the United
States under present circumstances and in view of the 
instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert 
will continue to give full recognition to the agree­
ment reached by our two Governments involving the 
maintenance of the French possessions in the Western 
Hemisphere. 7
Under such circumstances the State Department was forced to
5 Thompson, op.cit., p. 185. 
^ Danger, op. cit., p. 185.
7 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
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denounce the Free French action, The term "so-called" was 
unfortunate, however, since it was subject to misinterpreta­
tion and appeared to convey the meaning that the Free French 
were misrepresenting themselves,
Roosevelt and Churchill, at the time, were in the midst 
of the Arcadia Conference in Washington, For Churchill 
this was his first meeting with the American secretary of
state and he was struck by the fact that, "...amid gigantic
8events, one small incident seemed to dominate his mind."
The President was somewhat amused at first by the incident
qand called it a "teapot tempest," y Later, however, when 
the criticism of the State Department reached such an in­
tensity that many of the department's highest officials 
threatened to resign the President took a different view of 
the matter. Also, in such critical times Roosevelt could 
ill afford to have doubt cast upon the actions of the 
government. For Hull the St. Pierre-fliquelon affair, from 
the beginning, was, "...one of those footnotes of history 
that had dangerous possibilities of becoming whole chap­
ters."
To heighten the State Department anxiety Admiral Leahy
® Churchill, op. cit., 111, p. 666.
9 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 488.
10 Ibid., p. 4?9.
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reported from Vichy that:
Darian referred to the St, Pierre-Miquelon in­
cident and said that the Germans had already used the 
seizure of those islands by de Gaulle as an argument 
for the entry of Axis troops into Africa in order that 
it may be protected against similiar invasion, H
The Vichy government, however, in an official communique 
noted with, satisfaction the news that the Federal
Government {in Washington] has publicly condemned the in­
itiative taken against its knowledge and sentiment by former
12Admiral Muselier,"
The Nation was the first of the liberal magazines under
study to take the State Department to task for the position
it was maintaining. In a front page story it said:
The evidence indicates that the State Department act­
ed on its own, pursuing with imbecile consistency its 
fixed policy of yielding to Vichy, snubbing the Free 
French and ignoring the contrary advice of Britain,
It then went of to say that,
without the least delay the President should de­
mand the resignation of the officials who on their own 
say-so betrayed the cause to which this country has 
been pledged not only by the terms of the Atlantic 
Charter but in many pronouncements by the President."
Was The Nation implying that the President was unaware of
some of the committments the State Department was making ?
In one section it called for an inquiry into all the State
11 Danger, op. cit., p. 218.
12 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 482.
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Department's actions in regard to Vichy, especially to see 
whether its officials had agreed to hold for Vichy the 
French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. If this were 
found to he true, the article continued, the President, 
.should find out quickly what it implied in terms of 
action." It warned that, "If the President fails to act, 
the dictators will have gained one of the decisive victories
13of the war." It is rather odd that the writers of this
magazine could think that the President was unaware of 
what his own officials were doing. Secondly, it is another 
good example of the lack of knowledge of these magazines 
about certain events. It is apparent here, for instance, 
that The Nation knew nothing about the stipulations of the 
Martinique Guarantee. This, however, was not surprising 
since the commitment was secret. The Havana Convention, on 
the other hand, had been published when it was signed. 
Notice, however, that there is no mention of the justifica­
tion of the State Department's actions on the basis of the 
Havana Convention but rather allusions are made only to a 
possible mutual committment the Department might have made 
with Vichy.
In this same issue the editors of The Nation sent a
^  Freda Kirchwey, "Mr. Hull Should Eesign," The 
Nation, January 1942. pp. 1-2.
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telegram to Admiral Muselier which stated:
You and the Free French forces and the people of 
St. Pierre and Miquelon have the unqualified support 
of all patriotic Americans who feel nothing hut shame 
at their government's betrayal of our common cause.
Hold fast. Destiny has put the defense of freedom in 
your hands and you cannot afford to yield or compro­
mise.
The Admiral, in reply, said:
The Admiral-in-Chief commanding the Free French 
naval forces, the marine volunteers, the immense major­
ity of the population of St. Pierre and Miquelon thank 
you with all their hearts for your telegram. I knew 
it was not possible that the noble American nation 
would not be wholeheartedly with us in the cause of 
Liberty and in the sacred right of peoples to self- 
determination. What ever happens we will hold on 
until the end. For all democracies of the world St. 
Pierre, like your Statue of Liberty, is a symbol. 14
Another article in the same issue of The Nation express­
ed its dissatisfaction by saying that Hull's "so-called" 
statement was, "...a stupidity that calls for his removal." 
This article went on further to say:
The State Department could not have chosen a better 
way to undermine the confidence of oppressed peoples 
everywhere than by its slur, and I think some way 
should be found to let the world know in decisive 
fashion that the undemocratic little clique of decay­
ed pseudo-aristocrats and backsliding liberals who 
dominate the State Department do not speak for the 
American people. 15
This writer also made the mistake of claiming both the
14 The Nation, January 5s 1942, p. 2.
^  I.F. Stone, "Aid and Comfort to the Enemy," The 
Nation, January 3? 1942, pp. 6-7.
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British and the Canadian governments had knowledge of and 
had consented to the operation. A writer for The Hew Repub­
lic made the same mistake. He condemned the secretary's 
statement and said: "The truth about the State Department is
not that its motives are evil but that some of its personnel
16are ignorant." The Hew Masses was satisfied simply to
ask for a clarification of the whole Vichy policy in the
light of the many contradictions inherent in our attitude
toward the Yichy regime on the one hand and our relations
with the Free French on the other. The writers for this
magazine were extremely cogent in their presentation of
the case and knowledge of the facts. The big question for
The Hew Masses was whether, "...the policy toward Vichy may
17not actually contradict our basic anti-Axis strategy..." 1 
Commonweal. for the first time not openly and completely 
agreeing with the State Department, noted its,surprise and 
shock at the State Department note but added, "...whether 
purposely or not, the action taken by the Free French at St. 
Pierre and Miquelon seriously interferred with our recent 
negotiations with the French government. It is obvious 
that we cannot accept such interference, if the essence of
16 The Hew Republic, January 3, 194-2, p. 3- 
^  The Hew Masses, January 6, 194-2, p. 18.
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18any policy be coherence."
In the first week of January the officials of the State 
Department and the President became extremely irritated at 
Admiral Muselier's insistence that he be allowed to remain 
on the islands. To substantiate his claim that he was there 
through the hospitality of the people, and by their choice, 
a plebiscite was held among the island population. The re­
sults of the plebiscite showed over ninty-eight percent of 
the people favored the Free French. Vichy spokesmen, 
however, claimed the people were coerced and all Free French 
opponents jailed. The next move on the part of the United 
States was a threat either to force the Free French out 
of the islands or to starve them out. The President agreed
19to all of these proposals, even suggesting the latter one.
Department officials also claimed during this period that
the Hull statement was not aimed as an insult at the Free
French but had been so worded because the invasion report
had not been confirmed at the time the statement was issued.
Hull himself, however, further confused the issue by stating
that the term "so-called" referred not to the Free French
20but to the ships. This statement led one writer to
Commonweal, January 9, 199-2, p. 284.
19 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 488-489.
20 lew Masses, July 25, 1942, p. 69.
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comment, "Unless it turns out that the Admiral [sic] and his 
crew approached the islands on surf hoards, this quaint' ex­
planation will save very little face; and that is as it 
21should be." In the meantime Hull and other department
officials in trying to build up their case made reference 
to the Havana Convention, however they omitted any mention 
of the clause which outlawed the taking over of any terri­
tory in the ’Western Hemisphere by force. In its place de- . 
partment officials had substituted another clause which 
stipulated that "no non-American state should be permitted 
to attempt directly or indirectly, to replace another non- 
American state in the sovereignty...which it exercised over 
any territory located in the Americas," When this note was 
published, The Nation, sustaining its attack, replied:
The absurdity of classifying the Free French coup, 
even if it had not been endorsed by the almost unan­
imous vote of the population, as a change of sovereign­
ty is obvious to any but a State Department mind. 22
The New Republic, now completely anti-State Department,
claimed the use of the Havana Convention to maintain
Yichy's sovereignty, "...implies that the United States is
23playing Hitler's game," v This was an extremely harsh
^  The Nation, January 17, 194-2, pp. 50-51*
22 Ibid,, January 10, 194-2, p, 22.
^  The New Republic, January 12, 194-2, p. 57*
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statement for the period if one remembers that the United
States had Just gone to war with Germany only a few weeks
before. The Nation's next comment continued this same line
of thought when it asked, "Are we against Hitler and his
puppets or are we against the people who are fighting 
24him ?” At this point The Nation also claimed, "The
Communist Party is backing the action of the State Depart­
ment in rebuffing the de Gaullists on the seizure of St.
25Pierre and Miquelon." ^
The New Masses, which followed the Communist Party 
line very closely, took many different stands on de Gaulle. 
Before the German invasion of Russia, it will be remembered. 
The New Masses called the Free French movement a "stooge" 
committee and a "phantom" of the British. After the in­
vasion, and the expulsion of the Russian ambassador from 
Yichy for espionage, The New Masses took a more concillia- 
tory attitude toward the Free French movement. But it must 
be remembered that de Gaulle and his movement always repre­
sented a threat to the plans the Communists had for France 
in the future. During the war the Communists were the 
strongest group within the underground movement in France
^  Freda Kirchwey, "Free ard So-Called Free," The 
Nation, January 24, 1942, pp. 82-83.
^  ^ke Nation, January 17, 1942, p. 65»
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and controlled most of the active groups that were not 
directly affiliated with them. This strength they hoped to 
maintain after the war and to help de Gaulle was to under­
mine themselves. Nevertheless, from June 1941 to June 1942, 
when things were going badly on the Russian front, any 
enemy of the Nazis was a friend of the Russians. This might 
be the reason why The New Hasses was soft pedalling de 
Gaulle at the moment. On the St. Pierre-Miquelon Islands 
affair this magazine did not support the Tree French but 
neither did it oppose them. It did, however, continue to 
criticize the State Department for its relations with Vichy.
In what obviously looked like an attempt to save face, 
the State Department finally ruled on February 13 that the 
Havana Convention did not apply in the case of St. Pierre- 
Miquelon. The true point of the matter, however, was that 
no country, not even the United States, had officially in­
voked the Convention. This announcement did, however, 
invoke some comment from The New Masses and it will suffice 
to show how one of the magazines felt just before the issue 
was finally settled. The New Masses, in a long article, 
asked:
What is State Department policy toward the Free French 
occupation of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon ? 
Nobody knows, not even those supposed to be directing 
it...This game of now-you-see-it-now-you-don't is only 
one more evidence of the utter bankruptcy of the 
appeasement policy with which the State Department 
career boys have been trying to buy themselves into
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OC-\the affections of the old men of Yichy.
The issue was finally settled in March when Admiral Musel­
ier was recalled under pressure from both Great Britain and 
the United States. Before long he was engaged in a long and 
hitter quarrel with de Gaulle and in the end he resigned 
his position as the highest ranking Free French naval 
officer. After Muselier left, the islands were taken under 
joint supervision by the United States and Canada for the 
remainder of the war. Thus ended the comic opera incident 
of the St. Pierre-Miquelon Islands affair but not before it 
had nearly done damage to the Anglo-American Alliance and to 
relations with the United States administration. De Gaulle, 
by this move, only increased the mistrust of him and his 
movement held by the State Department. The British also 
began to.take a more cautious view of him. To some American 
liberals de Gaulle was the darling of the freedom movement 
but to others, if he did not sit next to the right hand of 
the devil he was close to it.
^  Hew Masses, February 24, 1942, p. 11.
CHAPTER V
THE ROAD IS CHOSEN 
January-November, 194-2
While the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident was at its 
height there were many other developments going on to 
plague the American Secretary of State. The accumulation of 
so much strife in such a short length of time prompted Hull 
to consider resigning. In his memoirs he states, "I so 
seriously considered resigning that I pencilled out a note 
to the President tendering my resignation." ^ The liberals, 
writing in the magazines under study, that had called for 
this resignation had no idea how close they came to realiz­
ing their hopes. Hull stayed on however, and weathered the 
storm. Nineteen forty-two was not, however, to prove to be 
a calm and serene year by any means. It had been ushered 
in under a storm of criticism and was to end in just the 
same fashion.
The Nation aside from its articles on St. Pierre-Hique- 
lon in January reviewed the entire Vichy policy. It con­
cluded that the United States had gained absolutely nothing 
from this policy and had lost much. The Nation claimed;
 ̂Welles, op. cit., p. 64
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This record of the State Department policy to­
ward Vichy indicates that our diplomats have become 
so involved in what they no doubt consider a policy 
of the greatest cleverness that they have lost sight 
of basic principles. It might be worthwhile to hang 
in every office of the State Department a sign read­
ing: "De Gaulle is fighting against the Axis. P^tain
is a prisoner of the Axis. Nothing the United States 
can do will alter these two facts. 2
The Nation, even though its writers were concentrating on 
the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident, continued to pound away 
at the whole Vichy policy never letting up from its origin­
al denunciation. Commonweal also continued to be the only 
magazine that consistently advocated that we maintain the 
Vichy policy and all that it implied. In January, Common­
weal praised Leahy and said, "He stands in the gateway of 
Europe with his foot there to keep the door from closing..
In February the French battleship Dunkerque sailed 
quietly off to Toulon from its North African base in de­
fiance of a promise given to Leahy ten months earlier. In 
this same month a German submarine stopped at Martinique 
to disembark a sick sailor and left before United States 
authorities could investigate. There were also reports of 
continued use of French transport facilities in North
2 Waverly L. Hoot, "Vichy Bait for Washington,"
The Nation, January 17i 1942, pp. 5&~58. 
x C.G. Paulding, "Our Embassy in Vichy," Commonweal, 
January 16, 1942, p. 309.
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Africa by the Germans. These events rankled official 
Washington to such a degree that it was decided to take a 
decisive stand with Yichy. Leahy at this point was so dis­
gusted with the constant bickering going on with the French 
that he requested to be recalled. No one, Leahy felt, be­
lieved the United States would ever take any positive action. 
The time had therefore come when the United States must 
show that it was not bluffing. The President was of another 
mind, however, and decided to give the French one more 
chance. In a note to Petain on February 11 he stated:
There can be no justification under the terms of 
the armistice for the shipment of war materials or 
other direct aid to the Axis powers, and without 
official assurances from the Yichy Government that no 
military aid will go forward to the Axis in any theater 
of war and that French ships will not be used in the 
furtherance of their aggression, Admiral Leahy will be 
instructed to return immediately to the United States 
for consultation as to our future policy. ^
No magazine made any comment on these events until the 
following month after Petain had once more agreed to ad­
here to the terms of the armistice and make sure no assist­
ance was given to the Axis. The Nation was again the first 
to note the new Vichy assurances and. pledges by claiming the
State Department had set a "new high in incredulity" in
5accepting them. ^ The New Masses claimed that, "Of all the 
q Langer, op. cit., pp. 235-256.
^ Nation, April 4, 1942, p. 382.
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prepost erous ignominies in the history of umbrella diplomacy, 
this takes the cake.” Later in the article the writer call­
ed the Vichy policy a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside 
6an enigma." It should be noted at this point that the 
American goyernment repeatedly was being forced to ask 
assurances from Vichy and that every time Petain obligingly 
pledged that the assurances would be met. After a while, 
however, repeated guarantees that are not fulfilled wear 
thin. Thus the liberals seem justified in feeling a sense 
of disgust that the State Department would continue to be 
duped by these seemingly false promises. The State Depart­
ment, however, had also reached that point and only needed 
one small incident to recall its ambassador. This incident 
finally occurred in April when Laval was brought back into 
the government replacing Darlan as Petain1s right hand man.
Before this happened, however, the United States'es­
tablished a consulate at Brazzaville in Free French North 
Africa and The New Hasses threw its entire support behind 
de Gaulle and his movement. In the article in which The 
New Masses finally supported de Gaulle there was no explan­
ation of why the magazine had decided to take this position. 
This was the custom for this magazine since, as has been
^ Joseph Starubin, '"Whitewashing Vichy," The New 
Masses, April 7» 194-2, p. 13.
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noted, it often contradicted a previous stand without ex­
plaining why. On this occasion the magazine simply said:
As things stand today, our policy still contradicts 
that of Britain and the Soviet Union. How long will 
it take the State Department to remember that the 
people of France are fighting Hitler and that the „ 
least we can do for them is to recognize de Gaulle ? 1 ,
Also during February The Nation began to question where 
Roosevelt himself stood on appeasement. The magazine an­
swered its own question by stating that official Washington 
was divided into three groups on the question of appease­
ment. The first group, the article states, is made up of 
people friendly to Fascism, "particularly of the Catholic 
variety, who would give Spain and Vichy anything they want." 
The second is made up of those who are opposed and in the 
middle "are those who think it necessary to dole out limit­
ed quantities of supplies to Vichy and Franco to keep them
from joining the Axis." The President, the magazine said,
8belongs to this immediate group. This statement was 
unique for up until this time the magazine had hinted that 
the President was not aware of much that was going on in 
his own government. This statement seems to imply that 
indirectly the President was responsible for the Vichy 
policy. Notice, however, that The Nation never comes out
^ New Masses, February 3? 19̂ -2, p. 19
^ Nation, February 28, 1942, p. 247.
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into the open directly accuses Roosevelt of being respons­
ible for what was going on in the State Department.
The Vichy policy reached another of its major crises 
in mid-April when the Germans decided to test their dip­
lomatic strength against the United States. As the Germans 
saw it the only reason Laval was being excluded from the 
Vichy government was the insistence by Washington that his 
inclusion would mean the recall of the American ambassador. 
The Germans decided to test this theory by painting a grim 
picture of future Franco-German relations unless Laval was 
immediately brought back into the government. The Germans 
won on April 15 when Marshal Petain reinstated Laval with 
the title of Chief of the Government which gave him the 
power to issue decrees on his own signature alone. State 
Department officials were horrified at this action and 
immediately sent instructions to Leahy to return to Washing­
ton for consultations. Laval, it will be remembered, repre­
sented to the State Department that group in France which 
looked for closer collaboration with the Germans. Laval, 
for instance, upon the entry of the United States into the 
war stated that he felt the United States had committed a 
serious error in entering the war. As he saw it if Great 
Britain and Russia were victorious over Germany then, 
"Bolshevism in Europe would follow inevitably." Under such 
circumstances he said he would prefer to see Germany win the
- 6 9 -
9war. Immediately after taking office in April he said in 
another statement, "We are placed before this alternative; 
Either become a part of the new Europe or resign ourselves 
to disappearing from the civilized world.” Even though
one of these statements may seem prophetic today, to the 
State Department officials of the time they represented the 
mouthings of a man who would stoop to anything, even to 
collaborating with the enemy, to gain his own ends. The 
State Department's case was emphatically put by Under Sec­
retary of State Welles when he said in reference to Laval 
and his group:
...that handful of Frenchmen who, in contempt for the 
tradition of liberty and individual freedom which has 
made France great, have sordidly and abjectly, under 
the guise of 'collaboration' attempted to prostitute 
their country to that very regime which is bent upon , 
nothing less than the permanent enslavement of France.
State Department officials knew that Laval was considered by 
the Germans to be the only man in France capable of bring­
ing the French over to full collaboration. Proof that they 
were right was found after the war in one of Goebbel's 
diaries when, in commenting on the Laval reinstatement, he 
said it, (the reinstatement), "is a tremendous advantage for
9 Langer, op. cit., p. 250. 
Bendiner, op. cit., p. 97* 
11 Ibid., p. 98.
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us, and for that reason it is causing alarm in London and
12in Washington.'1
The Nation reacted immediately to the news and claimed
that:
The change at Vichy, indicating as it does complete 
subservience to Berlin, represents a serious diplo­
matic defeat for the State Department. The effects 
of which can only be offset by a complete reversal 
of its appeasement policy. 13
In another article it said:
It is good that the United States government is being 
forced at last to abandon the pretense that it, not 
Hitler, was handling the strings attached to the 
puppet. It is good that our attempt to persuade the 
French people of our friendship while we snubbed their 
leaders, and bribed and cozened sic their betrayers 
has at last collapsed: the end of equivocation is at 
last in sight. 14-
In still a third article this magazine recommended that we 
pull out of France entirely, diplomatically, and to recog­
nize de Gaulle. The writer felt that any future relations 
with Vichy, even though our ambassador was to be recalled,
would require working with Laval and this would brand 
>America as a helpmate in any future collaboration with the
Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 194-2-194-3 
edit, and trans. Louis P. Lochner^ (Garden City, lew York: 
Doubleday and Co., 194-8), p. 129»
The Nation, April 18, 194-2, p. 4-45.
T 4 Freda Kirchwey, "Laval Takes Over," The Nation 
April 25, 1942, pp. 477-478.
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15Germans. ^ The New Republic also described the Laval re­
instatement as a diplomatic defeat for the State Department 
and claimed,
"...we played at diplomacy with Yichy and aided it month
by month to brew the poison of collaboration in the dispair
16of a defeated people." The New Masses, after saying,
"and so the State Department policy of playing ball with
Marshal Petain comes to its ignoble denouement as we always
said it would," called for a break in relations and immed-
17iate recognition of the Free French. '
Commonweal, as usual, disagreed with these three mag­
azines and took a peculiar stand on the Laval issue. In the 
first part of the article the magazine stated, "Laval has 
returned to power and we do not judge his intentions. Not 
improbably he is moved by a desire to serve his country." 
Later in the article, however, the writer states that he 
is against Laval because German pressure brought him back 
into power. The German pressure to bring Laval back, the 
article ends, came, "...not from a failure of American pol­
icy— our presence in Yichy— but from the relative success
15 Louis Fischer, "Laval and Roosevelt," The Nation, 
April 25, 19̂ -2, pp. 486-487.
The New Republic, May 4, 1942, p. 602.
^  The New Masses, April 28, 1942, p. 19.
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of that policy and from an intense desire to bring it to 
1an end." In June Commonweal clarified its position by
stating:
We based our position on a primary necessity of main­
taining contact with the people of France, and through 
them with all the peoples now subject to German rule 
in Europe, and we intended through this contact to 
uphold their hopes of liberation. 19
The plea in this article was to keep relations open even
though Leahy had been recalled.
In this same month of June Laval publicly stated, "I
forsee a German victory" and went on to add that the allied
20cause was lost. With this statement Laval lost all
chance of finding any further sympathy, if ever there had 
been any, within the State Department and certain liberal 
circles, low the majority of the liberal Journals were to 
concentrate on gaining complete recognition for de Gaulle 
and to discrediting the previous State Department relations 
with Yichy and the simple ties that remained. Again, The 
Nation led the attack by an early article which stated in 
part:
Laval openly expresses a hope for a German victory, 
nevertheless, we are resuming supplies to North 
Africa, we continue official relations with a govern-
Commonweal, April 24, 1942, p. 4.
19 Ibid.. June 17, 1942, p. 197.
20 Thompson, op. cit., p. 79.
-73-
ment headed by a man whom our secretary of state 
acknowledges to be a German puppet, and our cold 
shoulder is still turned toward the Free French who 
are fighting and dying on our side. Is there some 
method in this madness ? We fail to see it unless 
there is lurking within the State Department the 
same fear that Laval expressed in one of his speeches 
— the fear that a German defeat will mean a Europe 
overrun by Bolshevism. 21
Later the smae magazine said, concerning the Vichy policy,
"The whole relationship has been a fraud, somewhat perverse,
22totally impotent." The Hew Republic, continuing to
fight strongly for Free French recognition, claimed, "The 
Free French are getting the rawest deal of any group assoc­
iated with the United Rations in this war." Furthermore, 
the article stated the State Department had given the Free
French, "One of the dirtiest deals in the whole cynical
23history of secret diplomacy." At the end of July efforts 
were again somewhat rewarded, however, when the United 
States recognized de Gaulle as the leader of the Free French 
But this recognition did not mean that he represented the 
sovereign government of France.
It was rather easy to say de Gaulle represented the 
true feeling of the French people and that the United States
21 The Nation, July 4, 1942, p. 1.
22 Freda Kirchwey, "Toward a Break With Vichy," The 
Nation, July 25, 1942, p. 65.
23 Varian Fry, "Justice for the Free French," The 
New Republic, June 8, 1942, pp. 785-787.
should recognize him as an ally. But there was no way of 
testing the French public opinion to find out if this was 
true and many officials in the State Department doubted it. 
From all indications coming from United States representa­
tives abroad agreement was unanimous that de Gaulle did not 
represent the true feeling and sentiments of the French.
Thus in the eyes of the State Department de Gaulle represen­
ted a group that had no mandate from the French people.
Plus this, he had no definite political program and was
proving difficult to work with in building up a resistance
24program even outside of France.
In August Admiral Leahy was chosen by the President to 
assume the duties of Chief of Staff and immediately his com­
petency was questioned in view of what he had accomplished 
at Vichy. The President's own estimation of Leahy and 
what he had accomplished at Vichy was expressed in a letter 
to the Admiral in early April when he had said, "On the
whole, I think our rather steady pressure has been success- 
25ful to date." The Christian Century, after many months
of silence on the issue, agreed with the President and said, 
"Admiral Leahy is an extremely competent man in whom the
24 Langer, op. cit., p. 257»
25 Welles, op. cit., p. 59«
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26President has great and well grounded trust." The
Nation claimed he was, "...a man who supported Petain and
even after the accession to power of Laval argued against
27a break with Vichy." ' Commonweal came immediately to
his defence and in a long article took both The Nation and
The New Republic to task for their continued fight against
the State Department and its Vichy policy. The article
began as an open letter to the French asking them to wait
for the coming invasion and "...to give no inner and
irremediable consent to an order we intend to destroy."
The article then continued by saying that this:
...is a language unknown to the editorial writers of 
The Nation and The New Republic...These people want 
French civilians to open the second front, violence in 
the Paris streets, a French revolution while we are 
still in no position to give the revolutionaries any 
effective support— they think the war will be won 
through their argumants with our State Department.
They attack Admiral Leahy, and they have not even the 
courage to admit that they are attacking the man who 
sent him to France and who now has placed him in a 
position of high trust. 28
The Nation immediately retaliated but took a rather odd
stand on Roosevelt. The article was a complete reversal
of the position the magazine usually adopted in that now
^  Christian Century, August 5* 194-2, p. 997 •
^  The Nation, August 1, 194-2, p. 84-.
^  C.G. Paulding, "Paris," Commonweal, August 14-, 
1942, p. 389.
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for the first time the "blame for any mistake in foreign 
policy was laid at the President’s door. The article in 
taking this position stated:
It is true that the President bears a particular 
responsibility for the Spanish embargo and for the mis­
carried policy toward Vichy; it is true that in the 
last analysis he is responsible for the sum total of 
American foreign policy, with all its mistakes of 
omission and commission* Yet it remains clear beyond 
a doubt that his lapses into appeasement have been by 
way of surrender rather than through choice. 29
Both The Nation and Commonweal continued this battle of 
words for the next month. The main contention that Common­
weal tried to make was that if the Petain group were to go 
and the United States broke off relations then a rabid Nazi 
such as Doriot and Deat would take over and this would mean
XQwar with Prance. The Nation, on the other hand, claimed
that to support both Vichy and de Gaulle at the same time 
was contradictory and thus the aid that was being rendered
7.1was uneffective since both factions offosed each other. v 
At this point it seems that both these positions are right 
and that the controversy is unsolvable. But one should 
notice that the State Department recognized this contradic-
29 Robert Bendiner, "Who is the State Department," 
The Nation, August 15, 194-2, p. 126.
50 C.G. Paulding, "Speaking Practically," Common­
weal , September 11, 194-2, p. 4-85.
51 Preda Kirchwey, "Hapsburg Hopes," The Nation, 
October 24-, 194-2, p. 401.
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tion and that their position in the middle left the depart­
ment with the option of choice when the moment was most 
opportune.
In the next two months there was to be much switching
of positions by the liberals. In October The Christian
Century, which until now had said nothing about de Gaulle,
half-heartedly opposed him as a future French leader in an
article that said:
General de Gaulle's importance as a symbol of 
French resistance to Nazi tyranny is generally ad­
mitted. But grave questions arise as soon as it is 
proposed to commit postwar France to his leadership. 
Here, apparently, is another of the taxing problems 
which will confront the United Nations when the time 
for peace-making comes. 32
The New Republic. then surprisingly, on November 2 publish­
ed a statement that said, "We do not belong with those who 
feel that there are no strategic reasons for appeasing 
Vichy. Undoubtedly the secret files of the State Department 
contain many such reasons..." Later in the same article the 
magazine further stated, "Many Americans are beginning to
ask when we will gather the fruits of our long continued
55devious policy toward Vichy." ^  Americans were not to 
have to wait much longer for these fruits for at the moment 
some of them were reading the words quoted above troop ships
^  The Christian Century. October 7* 194-2, p. 1205. 
The New Republic, November 2, 194-2, p. 564-.
were heading toward North Africa in Operation "Torch.
CHAPTER VI
THE POLICY ENDS 
November-Deeember, 194-2
On November 8, 1942 American forces landed in North 
Africa and the Vichy policy came to an end when Marshal 
Petain broke off diplomatic relations with the United States. 
Before the landing, however, there were many plans initiated 
that were to have a bearing on the policy and its immediate 
aftereffects. In Spetember, for instance, Roosevelt decid­
ed to find a French leader to administer the conquered area 
until the war ended. General Giraud was the man finally 
chosen since it was felt he was outside both the Vichy and 
the de Gaulle camps having been in a German prison until 
his escape the previous April. Both General de Gaulle and 
General Giraud had been discussed. In comparing these two 
men Roosevelt once said:
General Giraud is the type of French military man who 
loves his country and is not in any way a politician, 
but a good soldier. General de Gaulle is a good 
soldier, patriotic yes, devoted to his country, but 
on the other hand, he is a politician and a fanatic 
and there are, I think, in him almost the makings of 
a dictator. 1
^ Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: 
Harper, 1949) p. 281.
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Meanwhile, since April of 1941 Robert Murphy and his 
aides had veen quietly doing their job of administering the 
North African aid program and spying for the United States. 
Many contacts with underground leaders had been made in this 
time and just two weeks before the invasion General Mark 
Clark secretly landed in North Africa to meet with these 
leaders and lay the final plans for the invasion. Since it 
was an American operation all final decisions were made by 
the President. Roosevelt decided to exclude the Free French 
from the operation for several reasons. In the first place, 
in two previous operations into Vichy territory, at Dakar 
and in Syria, de Gaullists forces had met fierce resistance 
from French opponents. It was thus decided on this one 
point alone that to include them in this particular opera­
tion would be tantamount to precipitating a civil war in 
the area. Secondly, it was known that his organization was 
well Infiltrated by Vichy and German spies and thus might be 
a source of leakage if the Free French were included in the 
planning. Also, because of de Gaulle's actions at St. 
Pierre-Miquelon and in Syria with the British, it was felt 
that he could not be trusted. In a letter to Churchill, in 
which he advised the Prime Minister of his decision, 
Roosevelt said, "I consider it essential that de Gaulle be 
kept out of the picture and be permitted to have no infor­
mation whatever, regardless of how irritated or irritating
-81-
phe may become." General de Gaulle was not informed of the 
operation until troops were actually pouring ashore and the
reader can well imagine his reaction.
Just before the invasion President Roosevelt had sent 
a personal message to Marshal Petain via the American 
charge d'affaires at Vichy to be delivered only after the 
operation had begun. The message read in part, "My clear 
purpose is to support and aid the Prench authorities and 
their administration...1 need not tell you that the ultim­
ate and greater aim is the liberation of Prance and its
Empire from the Axis yoke." When the message was delivered
the marshal immediately penned a reply that was very unco­
operative and said, "You knew that we would defend the 
Empire against any aggressor...You knew that I would keep my 
word. We have been attacked, and we shall defend ourselves. 
That is the order I am issuing." But as he handed this 
reply to Pinckney Tuck, the American charge d'affaires, it 
is said that he gave him a knowing tap on the shoulder as 
if to say, "This is only for the record." Nevertheless, 
the Vichy forces in North Africa did resist the American 
landing and to the surprise of General Eisenhower, who had 
charge of the operation, the French leaders in the area
2 Langer, op. cit., p. 290. 
 ̂ Ibid., op. cit., p. 3^9*
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would have nothing to do with General Giraud. But there 
was an even greater surprise in store for the Americans for 
Admiral Darlan had, at this most inopportune of times, de­
cided to come to Algiers to visit his ailing son.
Darlan was immediately captured and ordered, since he 
was the French Supreme Military Commander, to give the or­
der to cease fire. This he refused to do until he had con­
tacted Petain. Less than an hour after Petain sent the 
ahove message to Roosevelt he was answering Darlan's re­
quest for orders by saying, "I have received your message 
through the Admiralty and am glad you are on the spot. Take 
what action you like and keep me informed. You know that
Llyou have my complete confidence." This, it would seem, 
left the way open for Darlan to'negotiate with the Ameri­
cans but he hesitated wanting to make sure that they had 
landed in such strength as to be able to control the situa­
tion and to stabilize it. He maintained this attitude of 
aloofness for three days and when finally faced with the 
possibility of being made a prisoner of war he decided to 
negotiate. Before the negotiations began Darlan ordered all 
French forces in North Africa to desist in resisting the 
Americans. The outcome of the talks was that Darlan was 
placed in charge of civil functions of the local government
q . Aron, op. cit. , p. 506.
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and General Giraud was put in command of all the French 
military forces.
Meanwhile, in Washington on the day of the landings 
Secretary Hull had summoned press correspondents to the 
State Department for one of the most ill-advised conferences 
of the war. Hull took this opportunity to settle accounts 
with those who had criticized the government's past policy 
toward Vichy. He interpreted recent events in the light of 
what had gone on before in an attempt to justify his pre­
vious actions. He said there had been five purposes to the 
Vichy policy. First it was an opportunity for the govern­
ment to receive highly important information from inside 
German-controlled territory. Secondly, the maintenance of 
close relations with the French encouraged them to oppose 
Hitlerism. Third, it kept alive the basic French concepts 
of freedom, looking toward the restoration of "free instit­
utions for France as they existed before the German occupa­
tion. " Fourth, the personal contact with Vichy helped them 
to resist German demands for an enlargement of the armistice, 
looking ultimately toward full collaboration and the surren­
der of the French fleet. Finally, and this Hull claimed was
the most important, was that it paved the way for the invas-
5ion that was then taking place. But as we shall see his
^ Danger, op. cit., pp. 366-367.
-84-
gloating was premature for the worse criticism of the Vichy 
policy was yet to come. Yet, there was to he one benefit 
in that some of the liberals accepted his argument and this 
tended to split the most ardent of the liberal camp.
Immediately the liberal magazines picked up the bait and 
began to swing their critical pens. The New Eepublic, tak-
i
ing the lead away from The Nation for the first time, was 
the first to comment. The article began by saying that to 
point to the North African invasion as proof of the wisdom 
of the Vichy policy was "to prejudge the outcome." Further 
it said, "If the Vichy regime exerts only a formal amount 
of force to save its face, the State Department policy may 
have been partly justified." ^ In the same issue another 
writer commented further:
On the other hand, it is certain that the policy 
frittered away much good will on the part of the anti­
fascist French, and raised doubts all over the world 
about our war aims...History may throw more light on 
the wisdom of our policy. But there is no assurance 
that the State Department was right. 7
Later, however, The New Republic in a long article condemn­
ed the secretary of State for his statements. The article 
stated in part:
The State Department seems unduly concerned with fight­
ing an internal war against its critics. So anxious
ST
The New Republic, November 16, 1942, p. 625. 
^ The New Republic, November 16, 1942, p. 624.
-85-
ha s Secretary Hull been to prove the rightness of his 
past appeasement policy that he has allowed himself to 
issue a statement revealing the most unabashed Mach- 
iavellianisms and has hereby played directly into the 
hands of Axis propagandists. °
The Hew Masses, in its turn, concemned the secretary and
predicted that no one would take Mr. Hull's statement
seriously. This writer claimed the policy had done the
opposite of what Hull claimed were its achievements. The
article said in reality the policy had helped, "...confuse,
discourage and demobilize the French people and enabled
him [Hitler] to maintain valuable espionage centers on
9American soil in the Vichy embassy and consulates." y
It was rather odd that on this particular issue The 
Nation waited two weeks before saying anything on the sub­
ject. In the first article the writer bluntly stated:
General Eisenhower's forces have rescued North Africa 
from the Axis and the State Department from some of 
its severest critics. The chances are excellent that 
North Africa will stay rescued, but I am not sure 
about the State Department.
In this article the writer claimed General Clark had paved
the way for the invasion and not Murphy and his aides.
this is obviously untrue. ^
® Ibid., November 25, 1942, p. 659*
^ Ihe New Masses, November 24, 1942, p. 3«
Robert Bendiner, "Was Hull Right About Vichy,” 
The Nation, November 21, 1942, pp. 552-534.
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The first criticism was mild compared to what was to 
come when the announcement was made that Admiral Darlan had 
been taken into the American camp. Though'the Vichy policy 
was officially over the magazine took the position that 
Darlan was still tied up with it and that in reality the 
policy had not been ended at all. Every magazine but Common­
weal had some comment to make on the Darlan appointment.
The Nation simply said, "Prostitutes are used; they are 
seldom loved. Even less frequently are they honored." ^
The Christian Century asked, "If this is what is to happen 
after American troops 'liberate* territory from the Nazi
menace, then in the name of the Pour Freedoms what are we
12fighting for ?" The New Masses said there.is every reason
to use Darlan if he would help our cause but it warned:
...Let us make certain that we do not permit this dis­
credited politician to use us in order to resurrect 
a new Vichy, obstruct the preparations for opening a 
second front in Europe, and short-circuit the activity 
of the French people at the very moment that they are 
springing to join us in the great struggle against 
Hitlerism. 13
The New Republic did not object to receiveing the surrender 
of such persons as Darlan, "when it will save lives and
Freda Kirchwey, "America's First Quisling," The 
Nation, November 21, 1942, p. 529.IP
The Christian Century, November 25. 1942, pp.
1448-1450.
The New Masses, November 24, 1942, p. 5*
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time." But, the article went on, "...to strike a military
bargain with them is different from welding a political
14-partnership with them."
Public opinion grew extremely indignant both to Great 
Britain and the United States against what most people 
considered a stupid mistake on the part of the State Depart­
ment. But, oddly enough, on this particular occasion the 
State Department was entirely innocent since it was the 
military, that is General Eisenhower, who decided to in­
clude Darlan in the government of North Africa. Finally, 
criticism grew to such a height that President Roosevelt 
was forced to made some statement on the matter. On Nov­
ember 17 the President said:
I have accepted General Eisenhower's political 
arrangements made for the time being in Northern and 
Western Africa. I thoroughly understand and approve 
the feeling in the United States and in Great Britain 
and among all the other United Nations that in view of 
the history of the past two years no permanent arrange­
ment should be made with Admiral Darlan...The present 
temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only 
a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress 
of battle. 15
But if the President, or anyone olse, thought this explan­
ation would act as a brake on the liberal criticism they 
were sorely mistaken. The New Republic questioned the
14 The New Republic, November 23» 1942, p. 3*
15 Danger, op. cit., p. 327.
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President's statement by saying:
The attack on North Africa does not suddenly make 
every previous action of our government perfect, as 
some official and unofficial press agents in Wash­
ington would like to pretend. Some of the earlier 
criticism, even of the State Department's famous 
policy of appeasing Vichy, still stands, and as to 
other parts, the best you can say is that it is too
early to tell whether our official attitude was ex­
pedient or not. 16
In another issue this magazine said North Africa should not
be governed by Darlan or anyone that the United States had
chosen but rather by a civil and military group chosen by
17all-the United Nations. In still another issue The New
Republic continued with, "...the North African blow was to 
have freed the French spirit but it has, by our acceptance 
of Darlan's aid on his own terms, actually depressed and 
confused it..." This article went on to say that those 
waiting to be liberated in Europe will now question whether
the Americans would accept "quislings" wherever they land­
ed ? The Nation, in its turn, stated:
What doubtless appeared a reasonable military 
expedient is proving a costly political blunder, and 
various government spokesman in Washington are trying 
to mitigate the effect of the transaction by explain­
ing that it is only a temporary deal at worse, due to 
be abandoned as soon as its immediate purposes have
16 The New Republic, November 30, 1942, p. 713•
17 Ibid.. December 28, 1942, p. 840
18 Ibid., December 7, 1942, p. 729*
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19been secured.
The New Masses throughout December grew increasingly
irritated at the deal made with Darlan. On the 8th it said,
"The continuance of any arrangement with Darlan, let alone
a further strengthening of his position, must be question- 
20ed." On the 15th its writers coined a new word, "Darlan-
ism," and said it is a "secret weapon forged to block
offensive operations into Europe, to dismember the allied
coalition, to set the stage for a new batch of criminals to
21replace the old." And finally on the 29th it stated:
'Darianism' is a kind of pathological politics to 
be cured not by cleansing but by surgery. The alter­
native is to run the risk of a plague whose ravages 
are without limit. 22
Meanwhile southern France had been occupied by the
Germans and on November 27 the main portion of the French
fleet gathered at Toulon was scuttled. Commenting on the
latter incident The Nation said:
...sunk beneath the waters of Toulon Harbor, along 
with the French navy, is a myth that bedeviled our 
foreign policy for more than two years— the myth that 
it was necessary for the United States to play ball
19 Kirchwey, op. cit., "Quisling," The Nation, Nov­
ember 21, 1942, p. 529.
20 "How Long is Temporary ?", The New Masses, Dec­
ember 8, 1942, p. 21.
21 The New Masses, December 15, 1942, p. 21.
22 Ibid., December 29, 1942, p. 4.
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with Vichy in order to keep the French fleet out of 
Hitler's hands. 23
Within the liberal camp there were things happening also,
for dessension had struck their ranks. The new position
taken by many liberals was that maybe the State Department
had been right. Others felt the department should not be
completely condemned until all the facts were known. A
good example of this dissension can be found in the December
14 issue of The Hew Republic, where in one article a writer
states i
...it ought to be admitted that the official treatment 
of Vichy could have been due, not to secret sympathy 
with Fascists or lack of aggressiveness, but to a be­
lief that this was the best way to serve our military 
requirements pending the time when an offensive could 
be undertaken...We can argue about the wisdom of the 
course adopted from now until doomsday without settl­
ing it, but it must be admitted that we still do not 
have all the facts accessible to the State Department, 
and that we are not Justified in questioning the 
motives of all those responsible. 24
In another article in the same issue a writer blandly stated,
"Looking back over the past ten years, we can see that the
liberals, ill informed or not, were right in practically
25every instance and the State Department was wrong." ^
Even The Ration, which had veen the bulwark of the
23 Q7pe Nation, December 5» 19̂ -2, p. 604.
24 George Soule, "Liberals and the State Department," 
The Hew Republic, December 14, 1942, p. 788.
^  The Hew Republic, December 14, 1942, p. 780.
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Vichy policy opponents, found itself under attack from with­
in and without. In two separate issues full pages of letters 
disagreeing with its current stand were printed. But The 
Nation would not give up its position but instead condemned 
those who would criticize. In a long article that went into 
all aspects of the problem, including the Darlan controver­
sy, the writer ended by saying:
The opposition expressed by The Nation to Darlan's 
appointment as military and civil chief in North 
Africa was received with total disapproval by many 
liberals...The mass surrender of the liberals in this 
country, their determination to believe that military 
expediency and political wisdom are identical, their 
rush to follow the leader wherever he may be heading— ■ 
these phenomenon are ill omens for the future of 
democracy. 26
Another writer for The New Republic also took somewhat the
same stand when he wrote:
Many liberals have failed to grasp the larger issue in­
volved in this criticism and have bent over eagerly to 
take their dozen strokes of punishment. A number of 
outstanding liberals, concerned with the integrity of 
their movement, still insist that it is in our best 
interest to admit that we were wrong in our critic­ism. 27
By the end of 194-2 the liberals were openly fighting 
among themselves over this issue. One aspect of the problem 
was removed, however, on December 24- when Admiral Darlan
26 Freda Kirchwey, "Darlan and American Liberals," 
The Nation. December 5* 194-2, pp. 559-560.
^  The New Republic. November 30, 194-2, pp. 698-699*
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was killed by an assassin's bullet. How ironical was Pres­
ident Roosevelt's statement when he called Darlan a "temp­
orary expedient." After Darlan's death few would still 
argue that the Vichy policy was still in operation but still 
there were its aftereffects. As some liberals saw it the 
continual snubbing of de Gaulle, by naming Giraud to take 
Darlan's now vacant position, was a direct result of the 
policy. To go into all the policy's aftereffects and their 
ramifications, however, is a project far beyond the scope 
of this paper. With the death of Darlan the main problem 
ended. What was to come after will be left for future 
historians to tell.
CHAPTER 711
THE BALANCE SHEET
There are many things to he learned from a study of 
this type. The most obvious from an evaluative standpoint 
is that all the liberals were not in the same camp. From 
the beginning Commonweal stood by its initial contention 
that the State Department's policy was the right one to 
follow. The Nation on the other hand believed Just as 
strongly that the policy was all wrong. The New Masses 
and The New Republic at different times vacillated on the 
issue. One was never sure where The Christian Century 
stood. As an adjunct to the problem, the question of wheth­
er to recognize de Gaulle or not received either approval 
or disapproval depending upon what each magazine thought of 
the main controversy.
Another lesson to be learned from this study stems 
from the State Department's contention that these magazines 
did not know all the facts and thus their criticism was in­
accurate and invalid. This study has proven that this was 
true, especially in the case of The Nation. But, because 
these magazines did not know all the facts does not mean 
they should have relinquished their critical functions.
For to have relinquished their functions as critics would
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have made them impotent. Perhaps one could say these mag­
azines were expressing their frustration, at not knowing the. 
facts, by the amount of criticism they produced. An ex­
pression of this frustration was the limits to which their 
criticism carried them, even to the point at times of leav­
ing truthfulness and objectivity, the prime journalistic 
virtues, behind. But this tells us nothing about the main 
question involved in this study. Was the liberal justified 
in criticizing the Vichy policy ? In the first place, since 
the magazines took many different stands on as many occas­
ions, one would have to first decide what part of the 
policy, or occasion, this question should be applied to.
On the St. Pierre-Miquelon episode and the Petain promises 
in early 1942 there is no question that the liberals did 
have a good argument to support their case. On the other 
hand, their criticism of the shipments to Weygand and the 
question of whether or not to recognize de Gaulle was not, 
in most cases, warranted. In the Weygand case, for instance, 
no one will now argue that the United States did not receive 
much more than was given. As for de Gaulle, emotion pro­
bably might have been the better part of valor on the State 
Department's part. But, look at what the United States 
would have lost had it been decided to recognize de Gaulle 
and his movement as the sovereign government of Prance.
If the United States had taken this move in early 1941, it
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is apparent now, the group favoring collaboration would have 
gained early control over the Vichy government. Secondly, 
the French fleet would have passed into the hands of the 
Germans. Thirdly, Spain, in all likelihood, would have 
succumbed to French and German pressure and this would have 
closed the Mediterranean to both the British and the 
Americans. How long victory would then have been postponed 
is anyone's guess.
The lesson to be gained from this, then, is that the 
Vichy policy cannot be taken in its entirety and condemned. 
To evaluate properly the criticism of the policy one should 
take each incident, as has been done in this thesis, and 
evaluate it on its own merits. The answer to the main ques­
tion, then should be obvious. No, the liberal critics were 
not justified in criticizing the State Department for its 
policy toward Vichy. For this policy was not just one 
position that remained stable throughout the period under 
study. As has been shown, the policy was always evolving. 
Add to this the fact that the liberals oftentimes did not 
have all the facts and this judgement can be seen as 
warranted.
Another question to be answered is whether their crit­
icism effected State Department policy. In the case of 
Vichy, after examining the facts, it can be seen the State 
Department was prompted in its actions merely by day to day
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happenings in France and not by what the Liberals were say­
ing* On certain matters, however, such as material aid to 
de Gaulle, one can probably say the meagre allowances and 
recognition he did receive were partly due to the efforts 
of the liberal writers that favored him. On the matter of 
material aid to de Gaulle the writers of certain magazines 
seemed to be fighting the old battle for the Loyalists of 
Spanish Civil War days. Similiar to the Loyalist case, de 
Gaulle was also refused arms and recognition. In de 
Gaulle's case, however, the government's attitude changed 
and eventually he was to receive full recognition. The 
final question on the matter of de Gaulle should be— what 
would the United States have gained had all its support been 
thrown to the Free French from the beginning ? Besides 
losing all that has been mentioned before the United States 
would have gained nothing in comparison. De Gaulle, in 
1940, it must be remembered, was a comparatively little 
known figure not only outside of France but within as well. 
De Gaulle owed much of his popularity, during the war, to 
the British propaganda office and many in this country re­
ceived their only information about him from this source.
In the first part of this study it was apparent that much, 
if not all, of The Nations facts on de Gaulle and on Vichy 
stemmed from British sources.
The liberals acquired their name for stands on other
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issues and the problem in this particular study is not that 
they were being "liberal" as such, but rather that the 
source from which the criticism came from has historically 
been labelled "liberal!'; The liberal magazines in this 
particular study, however, could have been replaced by just 
about any other five different magazines or mewspapers.
Their positions on the individual incidents were that varied 
at times.
In the final analysis, however, to get back to the main 
point, it cannot be disputed that no French ship was ever 
taken over and manned by the Germans against the United 
States. This, it will be remembered, was the first concern 
of the President when it appeared that France might fall in
1940. With this concern the Vichy policy began and later 
was to germinate the thoughts that originated this paper.
The final judgement ? Maybe a statement Marshal Pet­
ain made at his treason trial would best answer that 
question. The marshal simply said, "God and posterity will 
make answer to your judgement of me,"  ̂ So also will they 
make the final judgement on the American Vichy policy, the 
liberals and their criticism.
 ̂Farmer, op. cit., p. 4-.
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